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EMPOWERING EMPLOYEES TO PREVENT 
FRAUD IN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
John M. Bradley*
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the significant problem of fraud within 
nonprofit organizations and demonstrates that current anti-fraud 
measures do not adequately reflect the important role employees play in 
perpetuating or stopping fraudulent activity.  Psychological and organi-
zational behavior studies have established the importance of (1) partici-
pation and (2) peers in shaping the behavior of individuals within the 
organizational context.  This Article builds on that research and estab-
lishes that to successfully combat fraud, organizations must integrate 
employees into the design, implementation, and enforcement of anti-
fraud strategy and procedures.  Engaged, empowered employees will be 
less likely to commit fraud and more likely to dissuade their peers from 
fraudulent behavior.  After examining the theory underlying the pro-
posed approach, this Article sets forth directions and specific sugges-
tions for designing an anti-fraud program that empowers employees. 
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INTRODUCTION
Reports of employees defrauding nonprofit organizations headline 
the news in communities every day: “An administrative assistant admit-
ted Monday to stealing more than $5million from the Association of 
American Medical Colleges”;1 “The payroll supervisor at a charity in 
Reynoldsburg, Ohio . . . used her position to embezzle $588,121 from 
the organization”;2 “An Oxnard woman accused of embezzling more 
than $400,000 from a Ventura nonprofit group pleaded guilty . . . .”3
Fraud perpetrated against nonprofit organizations by their em-
ployees is part of a consistent and, by some reports, growing ethical 
problem within nonprofit organizations.  Yet despite the attention of 
lawmakers, regulators, and sector watchdogs, the lack of regulatory re-
sources demands that the task of confronting problematic ethical issues 
such as fraud largely falls to the organizations themselves.4
Fraud is a troublesome aspect of a nonprofit sector that continues 
to advance in size and scope.  Since the mid-twentieth century, the 
nonprofit sector has steadily grown as a percentage of United States 
1 Ann E. Marimow & Mary Pat Flaherty, Md. Woman Admits Stealing Millions from D.C. Non-
profit, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/md-woman-
admits-stealing-millions-from-dc-nonprofit/2013/11/25/723a7c14-55f6-11e3-835d-e7173847c
7cc_story.html. 
2 Ohio Woman Gets 2 Years for $588,000 Theft at Nonprofit, THE CHRON.OF PHILANTHROPY
(Aug. 26, 2014), http://philanthropy.com/blogs/philanthropytoday/ohio-woman-gets-2-years-
for-588000-theft-at-nonprofit/89871. 
3 Oxnard Woman Admits to Embezzling from Ventura Nonprofit, VENTURA CNTY. STAR, Oct. 
3, 2013, http://www.vcstar.com/news/oxnard-woman-admits-to-embezzlement-from-ventura. 
4 See Suzanne Perry, Government Regulators Need More Money and Data, Experts Say, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY (Feb. 12, 2013), http://philanthropy.com/article/Government-Regulators-
Need/137269/ (reporting that officials and experts believe that “both state and federal regula-
tory systems were inadequate to the task of monitoring more than 1 million charities”); Kevin 
P. Kearns, Accountability in the Nonprofit Sector, in THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 587 (2d 
ed. 2012) (“Well documented that the IRS lacks the resources and management capacity to ef-
fectively performs its oversight role.”).
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economic activity.5  Some two million organizations are now engaged in 
efforts to end homelessness, provide cancer treatments, preserve eco-
systems, improve education, and contribute to a number of other 
worthwhile endeavors.6  More than thirteen million people work for 
these organizations.7  Yet in the midst of the real good accomplished by 
these dedicated organizations and people, fraud may be costing the sec-
tor some $40 billion—5% of the sector’s revenues—each year.8
Despite the complicity of employees in this problem, this Article 
proposes that the solution depends upon enlisting the assistance of the 
employees themselves.  The dominant efforts to prevent fraud have 
approached the problem by focusing on oversight mechanisms or the 
example of those in leadership, with employee involvement playing a 
much smaller role—if at all—in the overall strategy.  By concentrating 
on employees, this Article sees fraud as an outgrowth of ethical deci-
sion-making, and examines how an organization can positively affect its 
personnel’s ethical decision-making by fully integrating employees in its 
fraud prevention strategy. 
Integration and empowerment entails more than simply giving 
employees codes of conduct, reporting mechanisms, and training—
although each of those are important parts of a comprehensive pro-
gram.  Empowering employees means soliciting and incorporating their 
ideas into the organization’s fraud prevention strategy and their partici-
pation in its investigatory framework.  It means issuing codes and poli-
cies that employees have co-authored—not simply received—and de-
signing trainings with employees as leaders—not just attendees.  It 
means making them part of the structure that is expected to stop fraud. 
Lawyers who advise nonprofit organizations may instinctively ob-
ject that placing employees in a position to help protect the organiza-
tion against employee wrongdoing is the proverbial fox guarding the 
5 KATIE L. ROEGER ET AL., THE NONPROFIT ALMANAC 9-13 (Kathleen Courrier et al. eds., 
2012) (nonprofit sector percentage of GDP steadily grew over past 60 years and now accounts 
for more than 5.5% the U.S. GDP). 
6 See id. (reporting that in 2012, there were approximately 2.3 million nonprofits: 1.6 mil-
lion organizations were registered with the IRS, 300,000 were religious corporations, and a final 
400,000 were smaller organizations); National Center for Charitable Statistics, Number of Non-
profit Organizations in the United States, 2003-2013, URB INST., http://nccsweb.urban.org/Pub
Apps/profile1.php?state=US (reporting that in 2013, there were 1,407,459 nonprofit organiza-
tions in 2013). 
7 LESTER M. SALAMON, The Resilient Sector: The Future of Nonprofit America, in THE STATE OF 
NONPROFIT AMERICA 3, 8 (2012). 
8 See infra § I. 
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henhouse.  But, as this Article demonstrates, social psychology and or-
ganizational behavior research suggests that employee involvement 
uniquely contributes to preventing fraud.  To capture this effect, those 
charged with preventing and stopping employee fraud should include 
employees as co-owners invested in anti-fraud efforts. 
In Section I, this Article sets forth the fraud problem facing non-
profit organizations and the nonprofit sector as a whole.  While there is 
a need for researchers to collect more data specific to the nonprofit 
sector, the available information demonstrates a fraud problem that is 
significant to intended beneficiaries of nonprofit work, all nonprofit or-
ganizations (whether or not they have been a victim), and society.  Sec-
tion II reviews the current approaches that dominate anti-fraud efforts 
(II.A.) and explains why the suggested approach of empowering em-
ployees should be adopted (II.B.).  In so doing, the Article relies on re-
search in the psychology and organizational behavior disciplines.  Sec-
tion III, taking direction from the cited research, provides specific 
advice for integrating employees into a fraud prevention program.   
I. THE NONPROFIT SECTOR’S FRAUD PROBLEM
Nonprofit organizations suffer significant losses each year to oc-
cupational fraud.9  By some estimates, more than $40 billion of non-
profit funds are misused or misapplied for personal enrichment rather 
than nonprofit work within the United States each year.10  To put that 
figure in context, the amount of nonprofit assets lost to fraud each year 
is equivalent to the combined revenue of twenty of the largest and most 
well-known United States-based nonprofits: the United Way, Salvation 
Army, Catholic Charities USA, Goodwill Industries International, 
YMCA, World Vision, St. Jude’s Children’s Research Hospital, Boys & 
Girls Clubs of America, American Red Cross, Habitat for Humanity In-
9 Throughout this article, I use the terms “occupational fraud” and “fraud” interchangea-
bly to stand for any scheme in which a person “use[s] . . . one’s occupation for personal en-
richment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organization’s re-
sources or assets.” ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS
ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2014 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 6 (2014). 
10 Id. The estimate of $40.24 billion is reached by multiplying the amount U.S. nonprofits 
contributed to U.S. GDP in 2010 ($804.8 billion) by the percentage of revenue that was esti-
mated to be lost to occupational fraud in ACFE Reports from 2010 to 2014 (5%): see also, Janet 
Greenlee et al., An Investigation of Fraud in Nonprofit Organizations: Occurrences and Deterrents, 36 
NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 676, 677 (2007) (estimating that fraud loss to the non-
profit sector in 2004 was $40 billion). 
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ternational, Feed the Children, Nature Conservancy, American Heart 
Association, United States Fund for UNICEF, Mayo Clinic, Care USA, 
Boy Scouts of America, and Susan G. Komen for the Cure.11  This is a 
staggering amount of financial loss. 
Given the furtive nature of fraud, a confident estimate is difficult 
to provide,12 but the available data shows that fraud-attributable losses 
to nonprofit organizations are neither rare nor insignificant.  Britain’s 
National Fraud Authority put fraud losses to its charitable sector in 
2013 at 0.22% of the income of all charities.13  Applied to United States 
nonprofits, the loss to fraud would be $1.7 billion—a still substantial 
figure.14  Another way to view the problem is by considering the num-
ber of organizations affected.  The Washington Post found that from 
2008 to 2012, more than 1,000 tax-exempt organizations had disclosed 
on their annual IRS Form 990 that they had “discovered a ‘significant 
diversion’ of assets, disclosing losses attributed to theft, investment 
fraud, embezzlement and other unauthorized uses of funds.”15  Only 
diversions of more than $250,000 or five percent of annual gross re-
ceipts or total assets are required to be reported to the IRS.16  Given 
organizations’ interests in keeping losses quiet as well as their simple 
failure to uncover every fraud, such filings likely severely underreport 
fraud.  Whatever the final numbers, what is certain is that fraud is hurt-
11 The 50 Largest U.S. Charities, FORBES (Nov. 2013), www.forbes.com/top-charities/list, 
(combined revenue for the twenty selected charities is $40.27 billion). 
12 See Leslie Lenkowsky, Despite High-Profile ‘Three Cups’ Controversy, Nonprofit Fraud Isn’t Wide-
spread, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Apr. 27, 2011), http://philanthropy.com/article/Nonprofit-
Fraud-Isn-t/127268 (calling into question the assumptions built into the $40 billion loss figure). 
13 NATIONAL FRAUD AUTHORITY, ANNUAL FRAUD INDICATOR 23 (2013), available at
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/206552/nfa-annual-
fraud-indicator-2013.pdf (fraud includes both external and internal fraud). 
14 The $1.7 billion figure is reached by multiplying $804.8 billion by .0022. For an estimate 
in the middle of these extremes, see, GERARD ZACK, FRAUD AND ABUSE IN NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS: A GUIDE TO PREVENTION AND DETECTION xvi (2003) (estimating loss to 
nonprofit sector of $10 billion). 
15 Joe Stephens & Mary Pat Flaherty, Inside the Hidden World of Thefts, Scams and Phantom Pur-
chases at the Nation’s Nonprofits, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2013), http://www.washington
post.com/investigations/inside-the-hidden-world-of-thefts-scams-and-phantom-purchases-at-
the-nations-nonprofits/2013/10/26/825a82ca-0c26-11e3-9941-6711ed662e71_story.html. 
16 IRS instructions only require disclosure of losses “if the gross value of all diversions (not 
taking into account restitution, insurance, or similar recoveries) discovered during the organiza-
tion’s tax year exceeds the lesser of (1) 5% of the organization’s gross receipts for its tax year, 
(2) 5% of the organization’s total assets as of the end of its tax year, or (3) $250,000.” 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FORM 990: INSTRUCTIONS 21 
(2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf. 
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ing individual organizations, intended beneficiaries, and the reputation 
of the nonprofit sector. 
Employees commit more fraud than any other group—and have 
for quite some time.17  They commit fraud in a number of ways: for ex-
ample, by pocketing fees for services before they are recorded in the 
organization’s books, by having a fictitious entity paid for services not 
actually rendered, by filing false expense reports, by gaining from an 
undisclosed conflict of interest, or by falsifying financial statements.18
All of these schemes have resulted in an ongoing problem, despite in-
creasing attention and efforts to combat it.19
Fraud perpetrated against nonprofits presents particularly trou-
bling problems for society given the direct impact on social welfare.  
Services that the nonprofit sector provides—such as in health, educa-
tion, social services, or cultural activities—go unfulfilled when fraud is 
committed.  If, as occurred in 2010, $5.7 million of Columbia Universi-
ty’s funds are stolen for an accounting clerk’s and associates’ personal 
use instead of going to New York Presbyterian Hospital, then a com-
munity’s health suffers.20  Or if, as was discovered in 2012, an employee 
17 ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON 
OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2014 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY (2014) 40 (noting that 42% 
of reported frauds were committed by employees in a most recent survey and that this “has 
remained remarkably consistent from year to year”).
18 See ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON 
OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2014 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 11 (2014); accord
ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL 
FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2012 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 12 (2012). 
19 ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON 
OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2014 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 6, 8 (2014); (reporting that a 
typical organization is estimated to lose 5% of revenues each year); ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED
FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2012
GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 8 (2012) (5%); ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS,
REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2010 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 
4 (2010) (5%); ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON 
OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2008 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 8 (2008) (7%); ASSOCIATION 
OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND 
ABUSE: 2006 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 4 (2006) (5%); ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD 
EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2004 GLOBAL 
FRAUD STUDY 8 (2004) (6%); ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE 
NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2002 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 4 (2002) (6%); 
ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL 
FRAUD AND ABUSE: 1996 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 5-6 (1996) (6%); see also JOSEPH T. WELLS,
CORPORATE FRAUD HANDBOOK: PREVENTION AND DETENTION (4th ed. 2013). 
20 Press Release, Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York County, Four Defendants 
Found Guilty of Defrauding Columbia University Out of $5.7 Million (Aug. 7, 2012), http://manhattan
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of a small substance abuse organization diverts $20,000 to his personal 
use, then someone goes without needed treatment.21
In addition to the direct monetary loss, fraud may have a multipli-
er effect on an institution by causing contributors to turn away.  Non-
profits rely to a significant extent on the goodwill and confidence of 
donors and volunteers.22  That confidence and goodwill may quickly 
erode when an organization is victimized by fraud.23  For example, do-
nors suspended their commitments to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria when the Associated Press publicized reports 
of fraud within the organization.24 As a result, the Global Fund’s ability 
to meet its operational goals was threatened.25  The Global Fund is not 
alone in suffering a multiplied loss from fraud: 27% of British charities 
reported that fraud negatively impacted their reputation, ability to fund 
projects, volunteer recruitment, fundraising, or some other operational 
aspect.26
Fraud may also work to the detriment of the nonprofit sector as a 
whole.  Particularly in the United States, nonprofits and the tax benefits 
da.org/press-release/four-defendants-found-guilty-defrauding-columbia-university-out-57-
million.
21 See Community Alcohol Information Program, Inc., IRS Form 990: Schedule O (2011), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/local/nonprofit-diversions-data
base (reporting $20,000 diversion). 
22 See Eleanor Brown & David Martin, Individual Giving and Volunteering, in THE STATE OF 
NONPROFIT AMERICA 495, 497 (2d ed. 2012) (stating that private giving accounts for 12.3 per-
cent of revenue across the nonprofit sector, but accounts for as high as sixty-seven percent of 
revenue for a subset of nonprofits, specifically those involved in international and foreign af-
fairs); id. at 498 (stating that “[v]olunteer labor is an important resource for the nonprofit sec-
tor: in 2008, an estimated 61.8 million people volunteered a medial amount of time equal to one 
hour per week). 
23 Kristy Holtfreter, Determinants of Fraud Losses in Nonprofit Organizations, NONPROFIT 
MGMT. & LEADERSHIP, Fall 2008, at 1 (“Compared to other organizations, nonprofits rely more 
heavily on public trust, so they have more to lose when fraud is revealed.”); see also, e.g., Ian Wil-
helm, Fraud Investigations Raise New Questions for Beleaguered Red Cross, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY,
Apr. 6, 2006, at 46. 
24 Jonathan C. Brown & Wilfred Griekspoor, Fraud at the Global Fund? A Viewpoint, 28 INT’L
J. HEALTH PLAN. & MGMT. 138, 139 (2012); Ann Danaiya Usher, Donors Continue to Hold Back 
Support From Global Fund, 378 LANCET 471 (2011); see also Sarah Boseley, Can the Global Fund 
Weather the Corruption Storm? GUARDIAN (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/
society/sarah-boseley-global-health/2011/jan/28/aids-infectiousdiseases; Bernard Rivers, The 
Global Fund at Ten Years: Not a Happy Birthday, AIDSPAN (Feb. 6, 2012), www.aidspan.org/
gfo_article/global-fund-ten-years-not-happy-birthday. 
25 See Usher, supra note 24. 
26 FRAUD ADVISORY PANEL, FRAUD IN THE CHARITABLE SECTOR 28 (2009), available at 
www.fraudadvisorypanel.org/pdf_show_129.pdf. 
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they enjoy exist in part because they are viewed as more reliable and re-
sponsive than the government27—an idea that suffers if nonprofits are 
seen as unable or unwilling to shepherd their resources.  Frauds suggest 
to donors that the exalted trust in nonprofits may be misplaced.28
Thus, a Gresham’s Law, that is, “bad money drives out good,” may de-
velop, “where publicized fraud cases may result in an unwillingness of 
donors to give to any nonprofit.”29  The ongoing occurrence of fraud 
may thus be eroding confidence not only in individual nonprofit organ-
izations but also in the ability of the whole sector to perform its work: 
the “ineffective[ness of the nonprofit sector] at routing out real and 
perceived corruption, fraud, governance and ethics problems” has re-
sulted in the loss of “the public’s trust in its ability to carry out its mis-
sion.”30
The heightened problems that fraud creates for nonprofits are suf-
ficient reason to focus on the sector, but another reason exists: fraud 
and unethical conduct in general may be on the rise within the nonprof-
it sector.  A 2007 study by the Ethics Resource Center concluded that 
“[t]he nonprofit sector that for so long enjoyed a better reputation with 
regard to its ethics now exhibits many of the shortcomings . . . found in 
. . . the public and private sectors.”31  With respect to the categories of 
fraud measured, ERC found rates similar—and in some cases higher—
than business or government.32  For instance, survey results indicated 
that 8% of employees in nonprofit organizations observed alteration of 
financial records, as compared to 5% of employees in businesses and 
27 See LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA’S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 13 (2d ed. 1999) 
(stating that there is often, and particularly in the United States, a “preference for some non-
governmental mechanism to deliver services and respond to public needs because of the cum-
bersomeness, unresponsiveness, and bureaucratization that often accompanies government ac-
tion”).
28 Margaret Gibelman, A Loss of Credibility: Patterns of Wrongdoing Among Nongovernmental Or-
ganizations, 15 VOLUNTAS 355 (2004) (concluding that the “vaulted societal status” of non-
governmental organizations “may render them more susceptible than other types of organiza-
tions to public disillusionment”).
29 Greenlee et al., supra note 10, at 677. 
30 Scott Harshbarger & Steven Netishen, Watchdog Wanted: Making the Case for Internal Over-
sight of the Nonprofit Sector, NONPROFIT Q. (Dec. 21, 2008), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/
governancevoice/1063-watchdog-wanted-making-the-case-for-internal-oversight-of-the-
nonprofit-sector.html. 
31 ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER, NATIONAL NONPROFIT ETHICS SURVEY: AN INSIDE VIEW
OF NONPROFIT SECTOR ETHICS iv (2007), available at http://www.ethics.org/files/u5/ERC_
s_National_Nonprofit_Ethics_Survey.pdf. 
32 Id. at 3-4. 
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6% in government.33  Furthermore, within nonprofits, the more general 
category of “misconduct” has seen rates, which once were below busi-
ness and government, catch up: 55% of nonprofit employees observed 
one or more acts of misconduct in 2007, compared to 56% and 57% 
for business and government, respectively.34  Moreover, a significant 
number of nonprofit employees do not report observed misconduct: 
about two out of five do not report, a number similar to their for-profit 
counterparts.35  Anecdotally, regulators have also reported higher levels 
of nonprofit fraud cases.36  Despite such problems, nonprofit leaders 
may not be recognizing or responding adequately.37
II. COMBATING FRAUD WITHIN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
Faced with the ongoing problem of employee fraud, what have 
nonprofit organizations done to stop it?38  Nonprofit organizations ap-
pear to have focused their efforts on management and external agents 
to design, implement, and enforce fraud prevention strategies.  But 
33 Id. at 4. 
34 Id. at 2-3; see also MARQUET INTERNATIONAL, THE 2012 MARQUET REPORT ON 
EMBEZZLEMENT 3, 23-4 (2013), available at http://www.marquetinternational.com (finding that 
over the previous five years, nonprofits and religious organizations experienced 12.2% of all 
cases of employee theft in the United States in which at least $100,000 was misappropriated, 
putting the sector behind only the financial services industry in prevalence of embezzlements). 
35 ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER, NATIONAL NONPROFIT ETHICS SURVEY, supra note 31, at 3 
(38% of nonprofit employees did not report); compare with ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER,
NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY: AN INSIDE VIEW OF PRIVATE SECTOR ETHICS 3 (2007) 
http://www.ethics.org/files/u5/The_2007_National_Business_Ethics_Survey.pdf (42% of 
private sector employees did not report) and ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER, NATIONAL BUSINESS 
ETHICS SURVEY OF THE U.S. WORKFORCE 26 (2013), http://www.ethics.org/downloads/
2013NBESFinalWeb.pdf (37% of private sector employees did not report). 
36 Greenlee et al., supra note 10, at 679 (stating that the Massachusetts Attorney General’s 
State Charity Office reported that nonprofit fraud cases have been higher during the first half 
of the 2000s as compared to the previous decade). 
37 Brennen Jensen, Are Charity Leaders Ignoring a Spike in Nonprofit Fraud, CHRON. OF
PHILANTHROPY (May 30, 2009), http://philanthropy.com/blogPost/Are-Charity-Leaders-
Ignorin/10149. 
38 The focus of this article is on what nonprofit organizations can do themselves, as op-
posed to relying on external authority. The current ability of regulators to monitor nonprofits is 
limited, see supra note 4, although calls for more robust intervention is growing. See generally
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the 21st Century: An Institutional 
Choice Analysis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479, 480,  n.4 (2010) (noting the “heightened interest” in 
expanding federal and state oversight of nonprofit governance); Woods Bowman, Nonprofit Ac-
countability and Ethics: Rotting From the Head Down, NONPROFIT Q. (Oct. 26, 2012), 
www.nonprofitquarterly.org/management/21259-nonprofit-accountability-and-ethics-rotting-
from-the-head-down.html. 
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those efforts are not bringing about sufficient success. 
This Article proposes that the current, dominant approaches to 
combating fraud undervalue and underutilize employees.  Fraud would 
be more often prevented with processes designed to empower employ-
ees.  This section reviews the current anti-fraud approaches and then 
examines the theoretical bases for empowering employees, establishing 
that employee involvement should play an integral role in every organi-
zation’s fraud prevention efforts.
A.     Review of Current Approaches: Monitoring, Leadership Tone, Directives to 
Employees
Mandates from legal authorities, pressure from interested constitu-
encies, and academic research have produced a range of methods seek-
ing to stop or reduce fraud.  The available data and the oft-repeated ad-
vice indicate that there are two predominant current approaches: (1) 
monitoring mechanisms and (2) articulating standards from top leader-
ship.  Providing employees with resources for identifying and reporting 
fraud is a distant third approach, although, as this Article argues, even 
these efforts are incomplete. 
The most recent Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
(“ACFE”) Global Fraud Survey shows that monitoring methods domi-
nate nonprofit organizations’ approach to fraud prevention.  The 
ACFE inquired as to the frequency of eighteen anti-fraud controls for 
its 2014 report.  Only five controls were used by more than half of the 
surveyed nonprofits: external audit (77.1%), code of conduct (67.2%), 
management certification of financial statements (64.8%), independent 
audit committee (54.5%), and internal audit department (52.1%).39
With the exception of the code of conduct, which is best categorized as 
part of the second dominant approach (articulating standards from top 
leadership), each of these methods employs a monitoring approach. 
Three major criticisms have been leveled at the reliance on moni-
tors.  First, if monitoring is the dominant aspect of a fraud prevention 
program, it conveys the message that the reason not to transgress the 
rules is to avoid punishment.  Because the goal is to avoid punishment, 
the impetus for anti-fraud controls is merely instrumental, stripping 
away any moral import to the fraud rules.  As a consequence, employ-
39 Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse: 2014 Global Fraud Study: Anti-Fraud 
Controls, ACFE, http://www.acfe.com/rttn/docs/2014-report-to-nations.pdf. 
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ees are subtly encouraged to think like economically rational actors—
pursue your self-interest—rather than pursuing what is the morally cor-
rect thing to do.40  Second, monitoring tells employees that they are not 
trusted.  This may lead to employees seeing management/the organiza-
tion as something in opposition to them and result in lower employee 
performance.41  It may also push employees to behave consistently with 
how they believe they are being treated, i.e., as not worthy of trust.42
Finally, monitoring entails significant economic costs that can make it 
infeasible for many organizations, particularly the numerous nonprofits 
that are small in terms of capital and people.43  Each of these criticisms 
supports the idea that monitoring should not be the primary focus of 
an entity’s anti-fraud approach. 
In response to the problems with monitoring, the idea of develop-
ing an ethical culture and an organizational values-first orientation 
arose.44  This Article espouses an approach consistent with that orienta-
tion, but criticizes the typical method used to create that culture.  That 
typical approach focuses on articulating standards from top leadership, 
yet fails to fully integrate employees in the cultural change effort.45
One of the earliest and still most popular attempts for creating 
such a culture is to issue an organizational code of conduct.  But culture 
or orientation—and a resulting reduction of fraud—does not arise 
simply out of issuing an organizational statement or code.  In the 
ACFE study, 67.2% of nonprofit organizations victimized by fraud had 
a code of conduct—the second most prevalent control.  Previous ex-
40 Scott Killingsworth, Modeling the Message: Communicating Compliance Through Organizational 
Values and Culture, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 961, 967 (2012); see also Sumantra Ghoshal, Bad
Management Theories Are Destroying Good Management Practices, 4 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC.
75, 85 (2005). 
41 See Killingsworth, supra note 40, at 968; Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and Organiza-
tional Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 941, 970-973 (2007). 
42 Killingsworth, supra note 40, at 968. 
43 Marla Cornelius & Patrick Corvington, Nonprofit Workforce Dynamics, in THE STATE OF 
NONPROFIT AMERICA 639, 642 (2d ed. 2012) (noting that 74% of nonprofit organizations are 
operating with expenses under $500,000). 
44 CHRISTOPHER A. MYERS, HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ANSWER 
BOOK §8B2.1 (2010) [hereinafter CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ANSWER BOOK] (“Research has 
shown that integrity-based programs that address ethics and culture are more effective than 
narrower compliance-based programs in reaching positive outcomes for organizations.”).
45 See, e.g., Daniel Alcott, Preventing and Responding to Fraud and Financial Mismanagement: Not for 
Profit – Safeguards, 38 WESTCHESTER B.J. 71, 74 (2012) (“In dealing with fraud, the tone is set at 
the top; therefore, the board must set the proper example by designing and enforcing policies 
and procedures for management to implement and employees to follow.”).
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aminations of codes suggest that, by themselves, codes do not impact 
ethical behavior.46  Codes may be important as an articulation of a 
company’s ethical orientation, and thus helpful if part of a consistent, 
comprehensive approach.47  However, if the organizational response to 
potentially unethical behavior does not align with the code, the exist-
ence of the code may produce a cynical response, in turn leading to 
more unethical behavior.48
While values-based communication and exemplary behavior by 
organizational leadership is important to establishing the culture, this 
often-espoused “tone at the top” is insufficient because of the distance 
between leadership and those at lower rungs of the organization.  Be-
tween top leadership and most employees lie a number of other poten-
tial influencers: lower-level managers and peers.  If the “mood in the 
middle” and “buzz at the bottom” are not consistent with the tone at 
the top, the disconnect can encourage fraudulent behavior.49  Thus, as 
will be argued below, in addition to those at the top of the organization, 
those in the middle and bottom of the everyday work of the organiza-
tion must be better integrated into the anti-fraud efforts.50
To be sure, employees have not been entirely left out of current 
anti-fraud efforts, although methods that include employees are signifi-
cantly less prevalent than methods focused on monitors or top leader-
ship.  For instance, 37.8% of nonprofit organizations conducted fraud 
training for employees, 38.8% provided a reporting hotline, and 45.8% 
provided employee support programs.51  Thus, in some organizations, 
employees may be the object of education efforts, they may be asked to 
report unethical or noncompliant behavior to senior management or 
internal auditors, and they may be offered support services to help 
46 Margaret Anne Cook & Sherry Lynn Leonard, Can Corporate Codes of Ethics Influence Behav-
ior, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 619, 625 (1998). 
47 Timothy L. Fort, Steps for Building Ethics Programs, 1 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 197, 199-200 
(2005). 
48 Linda Klebe Trevino et al, (Un)Ethical Behavior in Organizations, 65 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
635, 639 (2014) (discussing Jennifer J. Kish-Gephart et al., Bad Apples, Bad Cases, and Bar Barrels: 
Meta-Analytic Evidence About Sources of Unethical Decisions at Work, 95 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1 
(2010)). 
49 CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ANSWER BOOK, supra note 44, at §8B2.1 (“A powerful influ-
encer of behavior in most organizations—sometimes even more powerful than messages or 
tone from leadership—is peer pressure.”).
50 Id.
51 Frequency of Anti-Fraud Controls by Type of Victim Organization, ACFE, http://www.acfe.
com/rttn-controls.aspx. 
36856-cap_13-3 S
heet N
o. 41 S
ide A
      08/14/2015   09:37:37
36856-cap_13-3 Sheet No. 41 Side A      08/14/2015   09:37:37
C M
Y K
BRADLEY FINALY GALLEY_8.12 8/12/2015 4:20 PM 
2015] EMPOWERING EMPLOYEES 723 
them through difficult personal or household financial situations.52
Through such efforts employees are expected to learn and abide by 
rules and guidelines established by management, auditors, or legal au-
thorities.  As a result, to the extent that employees are included within 
the anti-fraud controls, it is often as the recipients of directives con-
structed and distributed by others—not as active participants in creat-
ing, disseminating, and evaluating the policies themselves. 
Yet despite the relative infrequency of including employees in 
fraud prevention efforts, employees are the most frequent source for 
uncovering fraud.  In the ACFE study, in which 81.4% of all organiza-
tions (and 77.1% of nonprofit organizations) underwent an external 
audit of their financial statement, only 3.0% of frauds were uncovered 
by the external audit.53  Other heavily used oversight mechanisms were 
more effective (e.g., management review uncovered 16% of frauds; in-
ternal audit uncovered 14.4%).54  But employee tips bettered them all.  
Employees revealed more than 20% of all frauds—exposing more 
frauds more than any other method.55  Employee tips were this effec-
tive despite that only 47.8% of companies offered fraud training for 
employees and only 54.1% provided a reporting hotline (as noted 
above, even less nonprofit organizations provided either training or a 
hotline).56
Because of this effectiveness, employers would be advised to im-
plement more hotlines and employee education.  That would be a valu-
able, though incomplete, incorporation of employees into the anti-fraud 
efforts.  But treating employees merely as recipients of directives misses 
52 See, e.g., Daniel Lucien Buhr, Five Fundamentals for Taking Compliance Management Seriously,
ACC DOCKET, Jan.-Feb. 2011, at 39, 42-44 (including in the “basic structure of a compliance 
program” that the company “informs and regularly trains its staff” about the code of conduct 
and “ensures that the staff and third parties can contact a reporting body, maintaining anonymi-
ty if requested”). Compare William H, Devaney et al., Protecting Your Nonprofit from Embezzlement 
& Fraud, VENABLE (Oct. 6, 2010), www.venable.com/nonprofits (discussing ten control 
measures to consider), with Jeffrey Tenenbaum & William Devaney, Detecting and Preventing Fraud 
and Embezzlement, VENABLE (Mar. 2013), www.venable.com/nonprofits (adding employee train-
ing as an eleventh suggested control measure). 
53 ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS 2014, supra note 17, at 19 (ACFE report 
did not break down the detection method by type of organization). 
54 Id.
55 Id. at 19-21 (reporting that 20.6% of fraud initially detected by employee tips.) Moreover, 
this likely undercounts the number of tips from employees.  Fraud was initially detected by tips 
42.2% of the time.While 49% of these tips were identified as coming from employees, a further 
14.6% were anonymous; a figure that presumably includes some employees as well. See id.
56 Id. at 31; see supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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an opportunity to more effectively instill a fraud-free mentality and 
drive in the workforce. 
Employees should not merely be told what the organization’s val-
ues are and how to behave accordingly; instead, they should be given a 
participating role in the process of designing, implementing and enforc-
ing the fraud prevention strategy.  The next section explores why this is 
an effective approach. 
B.     Theoretical Support for the Proposed Approach of Empowering Employees 
The important role that employee tips play in exposing fraud is 
proof that the success of an anti-fraud strategy depends to a large ex-
tent on employee cooperation.  Employees must decide whether to par-
ticipate in a fraud, stand idly by while suspecting a fraud, or act to pre-
vent or stop a fraud.  They also make decisions whether to participate 
in or allow avoidance of anti-fraud controls.  Although employees’ in-
tentions in allowing circumvention of the rules may be innocent (e.g., 
to allow a faster than normal response to a co-worker or third party or 
pursue what they believe is a more important organizational end) the 
effect may be to provide the opportunity for fraud to occur.  Conse-
quently, employees’ understanding of the rationale for the anti-fraud
control mechanisms, their dedication to upholding the integrity of 
those measures, and their input in determining when a particular meas-
ure could be better designed are critically important to ensure control 
effectiveness.
Certainly, surveillance can make an errant employee’s nefarious 
plans more difficult to put into action, and the work of internal auditors 
and lawyers can be useful in uncovering and investigating suspected 
frauds.  Proposing that employees be included in anti-fraud efforts does 
not mean that these fraud mechanisms and experts should be excluded 
from the process.  Rather, incorporating employees in crafting and en-
forcing corporate anti-fraud rules adds a critical and otherwise lacking 
component to an anti-fraud program.  And, if implemented as suggest-
ed in Section III below, this approach would be part of a comprehen-
sive ethics system.  It also may enable fewer resources to be used on 
enforcing control mechanisms.57
57 See Tom R. Tyler, Promoting Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Work Settings: The 
Value of Self-Regulatory Approaches, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287, 1295 (2005) (noting the significant 
costs of a command-and-control system). 
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Social psychology and organizational behavior research supports 
the idea that active employee participation in anti-fraud efforts—
beyond just the occasional employee tip hotline—would be a valuable 
addition to a nonprofit organization’s response to economic crime.  In 
the following sections, this Article explains the two theories supporting 
the full incorporation of employees in anti-fraud efforts. 
The first theory relates to employee participation as a means to se-
cure each individual’s buy-in to the organization’s goals (one of which
presumably is to prevent the illicit use of organizational funds).  Incor-
porating an employee in relevant processes has a powerful effect on the 
employee.  When she is empowered through opportunities to partici-
pate, she will scrupulously attend to anti-fraud rules and work for com-
pliance by other employees.  The second theory relates to the concept 
of peer group influence, which helps create a culture of compliance in 
the entire workforce.  Employees committed to a fraud-free workplace 
send a signal to their peers, and that signal influences the behavior of 
other workers—making all employees less likely to commit fraud. 
i.     Employees Who Participate in Decision-Making Scrupulously 
Attend to the Rules and Seek Compliance by Others 
Employee participation in fraud-prevention efforts is likely to lead 
to positive behaviors, such as meticulous rule-following and internal 
whistleblowing, beyond what the organization is able or willing to en-
force with sanctions or rewards.  The key connection is the role that 
employee participation plays in creating procedural justice, which in 
turn enhances an employee’s affective commitment to organizational 
objectives.
Procedural justice is defined as the perceived fairness of the pro-
cedures or means used to determine an outcome.58  Procedural justice is 
different from distributive justice, which is concerned with the per-
ceived fairness of the outcomes.59  Participation in decision-making is 
vital because it is one of the primary elements that bring about proce-
dural justice.60
58 Chockolingam Viswesvaran & Deniz S. Ones, Examining the Construct of Organizational Jus-
tice: A Meta-Analytic Evaluation of Relations with Work Attitudes and Behaviors, 38 J. BUS. ETHICS 193, 
193 (2002). 
59 Id.
60 Tom R. Tyler, Justice, in GROUP PROCESSES 111, 124-125 (John M. Levine ed., 2013). The 
others are “a neutral forum, trustworthy authorities, and treatment with dignity and respect.” Id.
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With procedural justice comes an employee’s affective commit-
ment,61 that is, an emotional attachment to and identification with an 
organization.62  Because the employee feels attached to the organization 
and senses that she belongs, the affectively committed employee wants 
the organization to succeed.63  Consequently, an affectively committed 
employee seeks to act for the betterment of the organization even when 
such behavior is not required or rewarded.64  This includes observing 
group rules, even when there is no fear that errant behavior will be de-
tected.65
The link between procedural justice and affective commitment has 
been observed in the nonprofit context.  In a study of decision-making 
within French social enterprises—akin to U.S. nonprofits—a significant 
positive relationship between procedural justice and affective commit-
ment was found.66  The process of contributing to organizational deci-
sion-making encouraged employees’ commitment to their organiza-
tion.67
In addition to following rules, an affectively committed employee 
is more likely to take voluntary steps to ensure that group resources are 
not lost through fraud committed by other employees.  For example, an 
employee might report that she suspects an ongoing fraud—even 
61 Id. at 119 (“[S]tudies of procedural justice indicate that it plays an important role in moti-
vating commitment to organizations.”); see also Marc Ohana, Decision-Making in Social Enterprises: 
Exploring the Link Between Employee Participation and Organizational Commitment, 42 NONPROFIT 
&VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 1092, 1096, 1100 (2012) (finding that procedural justice was positive-
ly related to affective commitment in the context of social enterprises); Viswesvaran & Ones, 
supra note 58, at 199 (finding correlation between procedural justice and organizational com-
mitment).
62 John P. Meyer et al., Affective, Continuance, and Normative Commitment to the Organization: A 
Meta-Analysis of Antecedents, Correlates, and Consequences, 61 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 20, 21 (2002); 
accord Ohana, supra note 61, at 1096 . 
63 Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Blader, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE,
SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT 55 (2000). 
64 Id.
65 Meyer et al., supra note 62, at 37 (finding a positive correlation between affective com-
mitment and organizational citizenship behaviors, including “compliance/conscientiousness”); 
see Philip M. Podsakoff et al., Organizational Citizenship Behaviors: A Critical Review of the Theoretical 
and Empirical Literature and Suggestions for Further Research, 26 J. OF MGMT. 513, 517-18 (2000) 
(summarizing the Organizational Citizenship Behaviors (OCB) literature’s understanding of 
“organizational compliance” as “capturing a person’s internalization and acceptance of the or-
ganization’s rules, regulations, and procedures, which results in a scrupulous adherence to them, 
even when no one observes or monitors compliance”).
66 Ohana, supra note 61, at 1100. 
67 Ohana, supra note 61, at 1101-02. 
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though reporting is not strictly required of her.  Ideally, from the organ-
ization’s perspective, the employee would report her concerns internally 
rather than publicly blowing the whistle, thus allowing the organization 
to respond proactively to combat the fraud rather than reacting to an 
outside probe by legal authorities or journalists.68  A recent study of 
nonprofit organizations found that employees were less likely to believe 
that they must publicly blow the whistle if they perceived that their su-
pervisor was “open to their participation in decision-making and rela-
tively democratic in their practices.”69  Thus, an organization that is par-
ticipatory—one of the key components of procedural justice—is more 
likely to be alerted to a potential fraud before public disclosure results 
in reputational harm. 
Consequently, employee participation should make it more likely 
that each individual will abide by the organization’s anti-fraud rules and 
policies and encourage them to promote anti-fraud success throughout 
the entity, but a final question remains: participation in what?  Most 
studies look at participation generally in the organization, not participa-
tion in any particular strategy or program.70  But beyond including em-
ployees in the general decision-making framework of the organization, 
this Article proposes that employees participate in designing, imple-
menting, and enforcing anti-fraud measures.  An employee’s everyday 
work is affected by the construction of rules designed to prevent fraud, 
e.g., how much documentation is necessary for expense reimbursement, 
what vetting needs to occur before contracting with a new vendor, 
68 Benisa Berry, Organizational Culture: A Framework and Strategies for Facilitating Employee Whis-
tleblowing, 16 EMPLOYEE RESPONSIBILITIES & RIGHTS J. 1, 1 (2004) (noting that internal report-
ing benefits an organization over external whistleblowing because the former “facilitates early 
detection of misconduct and creates opportunity for timely investigation and corrective ac-
tion”).
69 Joyce Rothschild, The Fate of Whistleblowers in Nonprofit Organizations, 42 NONPROFIT &
VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 886, 891 (2013). 
70 Importantly, this suggests that participation and fairness with respect to anti-fraud 
measures cannot be separated out from fairness in the workplace generally. One implication for 
nonprofit organizations, which typically pay their employees less than what they could earn in 
the private sector, is to consider whether employees perceive that pay decisions are made in a 
procedurally just manner. While resource limitations may make salary increases impossible, the 
outcome may be less important than the process. See Tyler & Blader, supra note 63, at 10 (stat-
ing that “prior research has suggested that procedural justice judgments often have more influ-
ence on people’s attitudes and behaviors than do their assessments of their personal self-
interest”). Nonprofit organizations would therefore be well advised to be transparent with their 
employees about the financial pressures on the organization and the process used to reach sala-
ry and pay decisions, thus contributing to the practice of procedural justice generally. 
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what rules apply to working with government officials in developing 
countries.  It is precisely because the anti-fraud measures impact every-
day duties that employees should be included in their construction, dis-
semination, and prosecution.  Developing an employee who will oper-
ate ethically even when not watched requires allowing him to 
participate in decision-making about his work.71  If the employee un-
derstands that the rules and procedures were a product of a fair process 
in which he had the opportunity for involvement, he will be more likely 
to conform to them and seek to have fellow workers similarly comply. 
ii.     Employee Commitment Sends an Influential Peer Message 
In addition to the enhanced anti-fraud commitment that participa-
tion engenders in individual employees, participation sends a powerful 
social signal to all employees that fraud is not accepted within the or-
ganization.  This social signal is critically important to influencing and 
directing ethical decision-making because most people look outside 
themselves for guidance when making ethical decisions.72  Organiza-
tions must recognize the typical appeal to external referents and seek to 
influence their personnel’s decision-making accordingly, by providing 
markers such as the behavior and language of other people (leaders, 
peers) and the establishment of rules (codes, guidance documents, pro-
cedures).73
In other words, ethical decisions are not made in a vacuum in 
which the actor dispassionately and rationally decides merely between 
personal risk and reward.  Rather, the decision-maker is influenced by 
personal/individual and contextual variables.74  Even the simple aware-
ness of the ethical dimensions of a decision is affected by contextual var-
iables.75  Awareness is theorized to be important for ethical decision-
71 See Melissa S. Baucus & Caryn L. Beck-Dudley, Designing Ethical Organizations: Avoiding the 
Long-Term Negative Effects of Rewards and Punishments, 56 J. BUS. ETHICS 355, 363 (2005) (contend-
ing that a “necessary characteristic of corporate communities” is allowing employees to partici-
pate in the decisions that affect “how their work gets done”).
72 Trevino et al., supra note 48, at 637. 
73 See id. (stating that ethical decision-making within organizations implicates influential 
“power and authority structures . . . organizational, leader, and peer influences and con-
straints”).
74 See generally id; see also DAN ARIELY, THE (HONEST) TRUTH ABOUT DISHONESTY: HOW WE
LIE TO EVERYONE—ESPECIALLY OURSELVES 237-38 (2012). 
75 Kenneth D. Butterfield et al., Moral Awareness in Business Organizations: Influences of Issue-
Related and Social Context Factors, 53 HUMAN RELATIONS 981 (2000); Celia Moore & Francesco 
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making as the first of four steps that lead to an ethical action: (1) moral 
awareness, (2) moral judgment, (3) moral intent, and (4) moral action.76
Among relevant variables, social norms (i.e., the behavioral expec-
tations that people hold in a particular context) are a particularly power-
ful influence on whether the decision-maker is aware or neglectful of 
the ethical aspects of a decision.77  In one study, participants were given 
two business decision scenarios and tested to see which factors influ-
enced whether they recognized the moral nature of the situation.  The 
researchers found that when the participants perceived that others in 
their organization or profession would see the issue as ethically prob-
lematic, the participants themselves were more likely to be aware of and 
consider the ethical issues involved.78  Moreover, the effect of this 
“perceived social consensus” on participants’ moral awareness was 
stronger than other factors.79  Prior studies also support the strength of 
perceived social consensus.80  Accordingly, the researchers concluded 
that, “although previous normative and descriptive writings have tend-
ed to suggest that . . . ethical decision making is an individual or per-
sonal process, this research suggests that, in organizational contexts, it 
is very much a social process.”81
This socially influenced, ethical decision-making process is particu-
larly shaped by peers: those whom we identify as similar to ourselves.  
Across a number of studies that examined cheating in higher education, 
the degree to which students perceived that fellow students cheated had 
“the most significant relation with student cheating” compared to a 
range of other factors, such as the existence of sanctions, the likelihood 
of being caught, and disapproval by authority figures.82
The university cheating studies provide a useful analog to fraud 
Gino, Ethical Adrift: How Others Pull Our Moral Compass from True North, and How We Can Fix It,
33 RES. IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 53, 56 (2013). 
76 Butterfield, supra note 75, at 982; accord Sean Valentine & Tim Barnett, Perceived Organiza-
tional Ethics and the Ethical Decisions of Sales and Marketing Personnel, 27 J. PERS. SELLING & SALES
MGMT. 373, 383 (2007). 
77 Moore & Gino, supra note 75, at 56. 
78 Butterfield et al., supra note 75, at 1001. 
79 Id. at 1008 and Table 3. 
80 Id. at 1008 (citing previous studies). 
81 Id. at 1001; see also, e.g., Francesco Gino et al., Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behav-
ior, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 397 (2009) (concluding that: “peer influence is an important factor in un-
ethical behavior). 
82 Donald McCabe et al., Cheating in Academic Institutions: A Decade of Research, 11 ETHICS &
BEHAV. 219, 222 (2001). 
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committed against nonprofit organizations.  Many of the aspects stud-
ied in the higher education context are either directly applicable or easi-
ly analogized to the organizational context; for example, honor code: 
code of conduct; faculty support: management support.  And, of 
course, the students in those studies go on to populate the nonprofit 
organizations that are the concern of this Article.  Finally and perhaps 
most significantly, the nature of cheating is similar to fraud—in each, 
an individual gains in violation of the rules and at the expense of a mis-
sion-driven institution. 
Across almost two decades of research into cheating, students’ 
perceptions of peer behavior consistently emerged as the most influen-
tial variable affecting cheating.  In the initial study, encompassing more 
than 6,000 students from thirty-one U.S. colleges and universities, the 
effect of variables such as the existence of a honor code, student under-
standing and acceptance of an academic integrity policy, the certainty of 
being reported, and the severity of penalties were measured.83  Subse-
quent studies focused on potential individual influencers (e.g., age, gen-
der, academic achievement) and contextual influencers (e.g., degree of 
faculty support for academic integrity policies).84  Across the studies, 
the perception of peer behavior was the most influential factor on 
whether students cheated.85
The finding was the same when cheating was investigated among 
graduate business school students, a population that has additional 
similarities to the workforce because it typically consists of older stu-
dents with previous work experience who do not live in communal 
housing.86  The diffuse community aspect might be expected to lessen 
the impact of peer-related contextual factors on cheating, but that was 
not the case in this study.  For the study’s graduate business school stu-
dents, the most significant factor in the level of cheating was the per-
83 Donald L. McCabe & Linda Klebe Trevino, Academic Dishonesty: Honor Codes and Other 
Contextual Influences, 64 J. HIGHER EDUC. 522, 528, 530-531 (1993). 
84 See, e.g., Donald L. McCabe et al., Honor Codes and Other Contextual Influences on Academic 
Integrity: A Replication and Extension to Modified Honor Code Settings, 43 RES. IN HIGHER EDUC. 357, 
358, 372 (2002) (“perception of peers’ behavior had the most influence under all three code 
conditions”); Donald L. McCabe & Linda Klebe Trevino, Individual and Contextual Influences on 
Academic Dishonesty: A Multicampus Investigation, 38 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 379, 387, 391 (1997). 
85 See, e.g., McCabe et al., supra note 82, at 223-224. 
86 See McCabe et al., Academic Dishonesty in Graduate Business Programs: Prevalence, Causes, and 
Proposed Action, 5 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC. 294, 303-304 (2006). 
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ception of their peers’ academic dishonesty.87
In the organizational context, coworkers make up an important 
peer group,88 and, as such, coworkers are likely to share attributes, con-
nections, and identities with each other.  Such commonalities influence 
ethical decision-making, for good and ill, by bringing about psychologi-
cal closeness: “feelings of attachment and perceived connection toward 
another person or people.”89  Within a nonprofit organization, psycho-
logical closeness may be generated through common group member-
ship (as members of the same organization, unit, or department) or 
identity (as persons mutually engaged in a particular mission).90
The resulting psychological closeness between coworkers signifi-
cantly influences behavior, even when the norm for behavior seems 
otherwise apparent.  For example, a person’s evaluation of the moral 
appropriateness of cheating is influenced by whether he feels psycho-
logically close to the cheater.  If he feels close to the cheater, he is more 
likely to view the behavior as morally acceptable and act likewise. 91  But 
there is an upside as well—if the person feels psychologically close to 
someone who has acted virtuously, he is more likely to act virtuously.92
Because perceived peer behavior is extremely important in shaping 
ethical decision-making, every organization should seek to create and 
propagate the (accurate) perception that fraud and other unethical be-
havior is considered unacceptable by the agents’ relevant peer group.  
That perception can be created among the workforce by demonstrating 
that employees are devoting their time, knowledge, and effort to com-
bat fraud within the organization.  The dedication of employees should 
be made evident through formal and informal channels, thus support-
ing the acculturation of fraud prevention and ethical norms in general 
throughout the organization. 
87 Id. at 299. 
88 Trevino et al., supra note 48, at 642. 
89 Francesco Gino & Adam D. Galinsky, Vicarious Dishonesty: When Psychological Closeness Cre-
ates Distance from One’s Moral Compass, 119 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 15, 16 (2012). 
90 See Id. (identifying ways in which psychological closeness can be brought about). 
91 Id. at 21, 23. 
92 Id. at 23. 
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR DESIGNING A FRAUD PREVENTION PROGRAM
The theoretical bases supporting the inclusion of employees in an 
organization’s anti-fraud program also provide direction for what that 
participation should entail.  Organizations characterized by procedural 
justice will work to have their employees participate meaningfully in the 
process of seeking to prevent fraud.  Entities cognizant of the distinct 
importance of peers to ethical decision-making will harness the power 
of those peer relationships.  Additionally, they will provide forums for 
the development of ethical leadership among employees.  Of course, as 
with any ethics effort, the unique attributes of the particular organiza-
tion must be taken into account when designing or reforming a fraud 
prevention program.93
A.     Employees Should Play Meaningful and Visible Roles in Fraud Prevention 
Effectively incorporating employees into organizational anti-fraud 
efforts requires that employees participate in those efforts in meaning-
ful and visible ways.  For participation to be meaningful, employee 
views must be considered (although they do not need to control the 
outcome).  Employees must be given the opportunity for their ideas to 
be heard in the decision-making process.94  Participation becomes em-
powering when employees are part of the authorized and accountable 
anti-fraud decision-making process.95
Consequently, the legal or audit functions (internal or external) or 
upper management cannot wholly own the fraud prevention program, 
which is not to say that those groups should not play a role.  Indeed, 
these groups can bring particular and valuable expertise, set the tone, 
convene and drive the agenda, and act to prevent possible collusion 
among actors.  Rather than anti-fraud measures emanating from any 
single group, employees should be brought in as co-owners of the fraud 
prevention strategy.  All employees should be targeted for ideas, feed-
back, and training and employee representatives should be part of a 
93 See Linda Klebe Trevino & Katherine A. Nelson, MANAGING BUSINESS ETHICS:
STRAIGHT TALK ABOUT HOW TO DO IT RIGHT 189 (6th ed. 2014) (asserting that changing the 
ethical culture requires “an in-depth analysis of the company and its current ethical climate.”).
94 See supra § II.B.i. 
95 See Benisa Berry, Organizational Culture: A Framework and Strategies for Facilitating Employee 
Whistleblowing, 16 EMPLOYEE RESP. & RTS. J. 1, 7 (2004) (defining empowerment as “a process 
that gives employees both the authority to make decisions and the responsibility for out-
comes.”).
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standing ethics committee responsible for overseeing ethical issues 
throughout the organization.96
In addition to being meaningful, employee participation should be 
visible, due to the important role the perception of peer behavior and 
attitudes plays in ethical decision-making.97  By making employee com-
mitment observable, organizations allow dissemination of the message 
that the employees themselves believe in and are committed to a fraud-
free workplace. 
The importance of employee-action for successfully preventing 
fraud within an entity suggests that such meaningful and visible inclu-
sion be extended to every aspect of the anti-fraud process: design, im-
plementation and enforcement.  With respect to design, all employees 
should be encouraged to submit their ideas for how to improve anti-
fraud measures, identify procedures that might have gaps, and suggest 
where controls might be missing their target or creating unacceptable 
and unanticipated problems.  The logistics of that process may vary ac-
cording to the organization’s size, complexity, and geographic reach; 
for example, some may rely mainly on anonymous, computerized sub-
mission systems while others may convene periodic meetings to review 
the procedures.  The ethics committee, consisting in part of select em-
ployees, would consider these ideas on a regular basis.  This review en-
sures a quality control check, though which ideas are exchanged and 
vetted in a transparent way, and demonstrates to all employees that they 
are a valued part of the process. 
Implementation should include using employees as part of training 
efforts.  Employees could be identified to help lead periodic, formal 
ethics conversations exploring the issues most salient for the personnel 
in their areas and in functions that interface with each other.  And to 
further enhance the visibility of employee participation, the member-
ship of the ethics committee should be prominently stated on all poli-
cies and procedures. 
Finally, enforcement entails including employees in the investiga-
tion of suspected frauds.  This presents the most sensitive aspect of 
employee participation, given the need to protect those being investi-
96 See Linda Klebe Trevino et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works and What 
Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 131, 147 (1999) (recommending that because of the importance of 
establishing an ethical culture, the “responsibility for ethics and compliance management 
should be held broadly within the organization”).
97 See supra § II.B.ii. 
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gated and to maintain confidentiality requirements.  But select employ-
ees can be part of the investigation procedure by, for instance, serving a 
term as part of a formally constituted investigation review panel.  Prop-
er instruction in the need for confidentiality and treatment as part of 
the control group for the investigation should alleviate concerns as to 
employee involvement. 
B.     Employees Should Be Engaged in Ongoing Conversations About Fraud 
Prevention and Ethics 
In addition to involvement in the mechanisms and formal struc-
tures developed to address fraud, formal conversations should be peri-
odically convened and informal conversations encouraged to discuss 
ethical questions, including fraud, relevant to the type of work engaged 
in by particular employees, the organization, and similar nonprofits.  
Engagement in such conversations works to accomplish three goals: (1) 
establishing ethics as a relevant and welcomed part of organizational 
decision-making; (2) enabling employees to take virtuous action; and (3) 
developing ethical leaders within the organization. 
First, the simple existence of ethical conversations makes it clear 
to employees that their decisions within the workplace should include 
ethical considerations.  This is critical because decision-making has 
been shown to vary depending on how the person frames the issue.  If 
the decision is perceived to not involve ethical considerations, then the 
person is unlikely to take into account ethics into her decision—even
when ethical problems exist.98
Even minimal conversations can have an effect on the way a per-
son frames an issue.  In a recent study, participants confronted a “right-
wrong” decision, akin to those decisions inherent in employee fraud, by 
having the opportunity to tell a lie or truth to a supposed fellow partici-
pant.  If the participant told a lie, it could result in a financial windfall.  
Participants were primed for the decision by engaging in a single email 
exchange with a supposed peer (actually a computer program) that ei-
ther evoked a moral truth-telling norm or a self-interested norm.  The 
results were significant: participants were four times more likely to tell 
98 See Blake E. Ashforth & Vikas Anand, The Normalization of Corruption in Organizations, 25 
RES. ORG. BEHAV. 1, 6 (2003) (stating that when “ethical issues . . . are not perceived or are 
subordinated to or reframed as economic, legal, public relations, or other kinds of ‘business’
issues, . . . managers [are] free to engage in amoral reasoning.”).
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the truth when they had a moral exchange than if they had a self-
interested exchange.99  The experiment was limited to a single decision; 
organizational conversations likely need to be ongoing and more robust 
if the effect is to last.  But the idea is important because non-profit or-
ganizations cannot assume that their employees intuitively know that 
ethical considerations are welcomed in the workplace.  This may be 
particularly true given the pressures to have nonprofits act more like 
businesses,100 which have demonstrated plenty of notable frauds and 
ethical lapses in recent years. 
Second, conversations make it easier to act once the individual has 
identified the action she wants to take.  Recall that moral awareness, 
judgment, and intent can all exist and still not result in action.101  To 
stop fraud, individuals must act, but conversations entered into before a 
particular situation arises can make it more likely that they will respond 
as needed.  That is the conclusion of the Giving Voice to Values program, 
founded by the Aspen Institute of Business and Society Program and 
Yale School of Management.  Wrestling with ethical questions enables 
people to act because the conversations demonstrate that they have al-
lies and give opportunity to develop their understanding of how they 
would effectively address an unethical situation.102  In short, conversa-
tion is preparation. 
Finally, conversations are crucial for developing ethical leaders 
within the organization.  Ethical leaders must be able to engage in ethi-
cal reasoning beyond reference to group norms, which, as discussed 
above, is how most adults conduct ethical inquiries.103  Such leaders are 
therefore important for guiding the organization’s adherence to laws, 
socially beneficial principles, and universal values.104
Interpersonal dialog is critical for preparing people for ethical de-
cision-making.105  This is part of the approach at the United States Mili-
99 Brian C. Gunia et al., Contemplation and Conversation: Subtle Influences on Moral Decision Mak-
ing, 55 ACAD. MGMT J. 13, 24 (2012). 
100 Dennis R. Young, Lester M. Salamon, & Mary Clark Grinsfelder, Commercialization, Social 
Ventures, and For-Profit Competition, THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 521 (2d ed. 2012). 
101 See supra note 76. 
102 MARY C. GENTILE, GIVING VOICE TO VALUES xxxii, 57-58, Appendix C (2010). 
103 See supra § II.B.ii. 
104 This list corresponds to Stages Four, Five, and Six in Lawrence Kohlberg’s stages of 
moral development theory. 
105 Leslie E. Serkerka, Organizational Ethics Education and Training: A Review of Best Practices and 
their Application, 13 INT’L J. TRAINING & DEV. 77, 91 (2009); see Baucus & Beck-Dudley, supra
note 71, at 363. 
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tary Academy at West Point, where cadets are both students and em-
ployees of the U.S. Army.  A recent qualitative study at West Point ex-
amined the institution’s ethical system to determine how the compo-
nents contributed or inhibited the success of the system.106  The study 
concluded that West Point seeks to form soldiers who would behave 
ethically by exposing past mistakes and encouraging debate, dialogue 
and reflection.107  This learning process accepts the tensions inherent in 
some of the values espoused, such as loyalty and honor, and seeks to 
develop people who can make ethically complex decisions.108
Returning to the studies of cheating within universities, the re-
searchers concluded that the highest cheating levels are “usually found 
at colleges that have not engaged their students in active dialogue on 
the issue of academic dishonesty—colleges where the academic integri-
ty policy is basically dictated to students and where students play little 
or no role in promoting academic integrity or adjudicating suspected 
incidents of cheating.”109  Accordingly, the researchers recommended 
that institutions consider “creating a ‘hidden curriculum’ in which stu-
dents not only receive formal ethics instruction but also learn by active-
ly discussing ethical issues and acting on them . . . allowing students to 
participate in the many opportunities for teaching and learning about 
ethical issues that arise in the day-to-day operations” of the institu-
tion.110
In most organizations, such opportunities for ethical learning are 
rare.  Most employers focus on disseminating applicable rules, policies, 
standards, and regulations, rather than “helping people learn and ex-
plore ethical frameworks.”111  The need for better fraud prevention 
outcomes within nonprofit organizations calls out for introducing ethi-
cal conversations in the workplace and incorporating employees 
throughout the organization’s anti-fraud efforts. 
106 Evan H. Offstein et al, Reconciling Competing Tensions in Ethical Systems: Lessons from the Unit-
ed States Military Academy at West Point, 37 GROUP & ORG. MGMT. 617, 618 (2012). 
107 Id. at 642-44. 
108 Id.
109 Donald L. McCabe & Gary Pavela, New Honor Codes for a New Generation, INSIDE HIGHER 
ED. (Mar. 11, 2005), available at https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2005/03/11/pavela1. 
110 McCabe et al., supra note 82, at 228-29. 
111 Leslie E. Sekerka, Organizational Ethics Education and Training: A Review of Best Practices and 
their Application, 13 INT’L J. TRAINING & DEV. 77, 81, 90 (2009) (study of selected organizations 
in Silicon Valley). 
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CONCLUSION
Including employees in the design, implementation and enforce-
ment of an organization’s anti-fraud strategy demands resources above 
what is required for a small group of designated persons—the legal de-
partment, the internal audit department, the board—to do so the same.  
This Article has not examined all of the costs and benefits of fraud pre-
vention approaches.  But given the expense of effective monitoring, the 
costs of including more people may be less expensive than purely top-
down approaches—even leaving aside potential savings from prevent-
ing a fraudulent scheme. 
This Article has revealed that employees are often overlooked yet 
vitally important to improving fraud outcomes.  Empowering employ-
ees moves the locus of the anti-fraud measures from someone or some-
thing external to the employees themselves—a move towards internali-
zation.  Thus, the decision to act in accordance with the rules becomes 
a personal decision, reinforced by peer influence, and reduces resistance 
to uninspiring “ethical edicts from top management”112 and reliance on 
financially- and socially-costly command-and-control systems.113  This 
process of internalization may be particularly salient for non-profit 
workers, many of whom chose to be part of a cause or mission-driven 
body.  Given the opportunity, they will likely respond to overtures to 
be more integrated into the organization’s governance, allowing the or-
ganization to not only improve its anti-fraud efforts, but also refine its 
ethical focus and build a more committed workforce. 
112 Timothy Fort, Steps for Building Ethics Programs, 1 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 197, 200 (2005). 
113 Cf. Tyler, supra note 57, at 1295-1296; cf. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 65 
(2006) (“Democratic societies require normative commitment to function effectively.  Authori-
ties cannot induce through deterrence alone a level of compliance sufficient for effective social 
functioning.  Society’s resources are inadequate to such a task and some base of normative 
commitment to follow the law is needed.”).
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INTRODUCTION
The adjudicative system is undergoing significant change as a re-
sult of the widespread introduction of various judicial dispute resolu-
tion (JDR) modes, which employ innovative hybrid methods of adjudi-
cative decision making, combining elements of adjudication with those 
of alternatives dispute resolution (ADR).1  This trend may be viewed in 
 * Schusterman Visiting Professor of Law at Yale University, and a Senior Research Scholar 
in Law at Yale Law School, 2013-15; Visiting Professor, McGill University, Canada (2007-08); 
Associate Professor of Civil Procedure and Jewish Law and Director of the Center for the Ap-
plication of Jewish Law (ISMA), Netanya College Law School, Israel. 
** Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Bar Ilan University. Head of Conflict Management, 
Resolution and Negotiation Program, Bar-Ilan University. Visiting Associate Professor, Alter-
native Dispute Resolution, Fordham Law School (2013). 
The article has been presented at the Yale Dispute Resolution Workshop, Yale Law 
School November 2014. Our thanks to the participants of the workshop, and to Noah Messing, 
Aharon Barak, Charlie Pillsbury and Judith Resnik for their valuable comments. 
1 See, e.g., Tania Sourdin & Archie Zariski, The Multi-Tasking Judge: Comparative Judicial 
Dispute Resolution (2013) [hereinafter The Multi-Tasking Judge]. 
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light of what Judith Resnik recently defined as “the privatization of 
process” — the reconceptualizing of adjudication by introducing the 
multitasking judge who manages, settles, mediates, and promotes new 
forms of alternative dispute resolution.2  This phenomenon corre-
sponds with the fact that “most cases settle”3 and that the traditional 
trial is vanishing (“trial as error”).4  Hybrid methods of judicial dispute 
resolution exist in many countries.5  An interesting hybrid method is 
used in Delaware: a state-sponsored arbitration program—a binding 
arbitration before a judge that takes place in a courtroom—which is an 
alternative to trial for resolving certain kinds of (business) disputes.6
Although Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitrations program share char-
acteristics such as informality, flexibility, and limited review with private 
arbitrations, they differ fundamentally from other arbitrations because 
they are conducted before active judges in a courthouse,7 because they 
result in a binding order of the Chancery Court, and because they allow 
only limited right of appeal.  Delaware’s special arbitration program was 
2 Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 162 U. Penn L. Rev. 1793, 1802-1814 (2014) (arguing that the new forms of ADR 
should be understood as a “New Private Process”).
3 Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, Most Cases Settle: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements,
46 Stanford L. Rev. 1339 (1994) [hereinafter “Most Cases Settle”].
4 Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 
Harv. L. Rev. 924 (2000). 
5 The various JDR modes and processes used in the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta 
have stimulated a great deal of interest and provide a good example for judges’ new roles. See,
e.g., John D. Rooke, The Multi-Door Courthouse is Open in Alberta: Judicial Dispute Resolution is Insti-
tuted in the Court of Queen’s Bench, in The Multi-Tasking Judge, supra note 1. This JDR program in-
troduces a voluntary and consensual process whereby parties to a dispute, following the filing 
of an action in the court, seek the assistance of a JDR justice to help settle the dispute before 
trial in a mini-trial, facilitative or evaluative mediation or binding JDR. In the German legal tra-
dition there are methods of judging and conciliation (“Richten oder Schlichten”), which also 
consist of hybrid forms containing elements of judging as well as elements of conciliation, for 
example the arbitration procedure. See Peter Collin, Judging and Conciliation – Differentiations and 
Complementarities 10, Max Planck Institute for European Legal History Research Paper Series No. 
2013-04 (2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256508. For examples from other coun-
tries, especially China and Canada see Part II of The Multi-Tasking Judge (Global Practices of Ju-
dicial Dispute Resolution). See also infra note 18. 
6 The proceeding of Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration is governed both by statute 
and by the Rules of the Delaware Court of Chancery. See 10 Del. Code Ann. Tit. 10, § 349 
(2009); Del. Ch. R. 96-98. 
7 In Common law judges may sit as arbitrators, in special circumstances.  See, e.g., DAVID 
ST. JOHN SUTTON & JUDITH GILL, 4 RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION 25-28 (22nd ed. 2003) (Indicating 
that under English law, in special circumstances, a judge of the Commercial Court or the Tech-
nology and Construction Court may accept appointment as arbitrator). 
36856-cap_13-3 S
heet N
o. 50 S
ide A
      08/14/2015   09:37:37
36856-cap_13-3 Sheet No. 50 Side A      08/14/2015   09:37:37
C M
Y K
SINAI FINAL GALLEY) 8/6/2015 2:45 PM
2015] COURT ARBITRATION BY COMPROMISE 741 
recently challenged by the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.8
Although the Court appreciated some of the virtues of Delaware’s 
state-sponsored arbitration,9 its decision was that the arbitration pro-
cess, which permits the proceedings to be kept confidential, violates the 
US Constitution’s First Amendment right of access of the public to civ-
il trials, which applies to Delaware’s proceedings.
Our paper calls to rethink the Delaware decision while discussing 
an innovative perspective which was not considered by the court in its 
decision.  Many pointed out the main merits of arbitration (speed, 
cheapness, secrecy, informality, expertise etc.) when compared with 
proceedings before the ordinary courts.10  We would like to point out 
some other merits of state sponsored hybrid judicial dispute resolution 
processes, such as Delaware’s arbitration program, by using the JDR 
processes as an opportunity to apply a broader scheme of judicial dis-
cretion.  Such a discretion, we suggest, combines formal legal consider-
ations with other considerations such as equity, peace, conflict resolu-
tion and social justice.  The possibility of a broad judicial discretion, 
based on equity and justice, authorized by parties consent is found in 
Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration program in which the Chancery 
Court judge presiding over the proceedings “[m]ay grant any remedy or 
relief that [s/he] deems just and equitable and within the scope of any 
applicable agreement of the parties.”11  This possibility of a broad judi-
cial discretion is found in the Common law concept of “equity” clauses, 
which allows the arbitral tribunal, when specifically instructed by the 
arbitration agreement, to decide the dispute on some basis other than 
the strict law.12
In general, arbitration is distinguished from adjudication in that 
the hearings are often more informal in arbitration than in court adjudi-
cation, and arbitrators are not required to explain how their rulings are 
8 See Delaware Coalition for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013) cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014). 
9 Id. at 22 (Judge Sloviter agrees with Judge Roth on the virtues of arbitration, and appreci-
ates the difference between adjudication and arbitration, i.e., “that a judge in a judicial proceed-
ing derives her authority from coercive power of the state, while a judge serving as an arbitrator 
derives her authority from the consent of the parties.”).
10 See, e.g., Fleming James, Jr. et al., Civil Procedure 348 (2001); Neil Andrews, Principles of 
Civil Procedure 551-552 (1994). 
11 Del. Ch. R. 98(f)(1). 
12 SUTTON & GILL, supra note 7, at 165-66. 
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in accordance with prior formal legal principles.13  As a consequence, 
both the sources of decisions and the outcomes of the arbitration may 
be at variance with what adjudication might have constructed.  Fur-
thermore, while adjudication is often described as a win/lose activity, 
decisions by some arbitration programs often entail compromises.14
In light of the creation of the new various judicial dispute resolu-
tion methods, among them Delaware’s arbitration program, a jurispru-
dential account of these methods is required.  The emerging innovative 
practices require a coherent theory that focuses on the inherent tension 
between aspects of adjudication and ADR, and that proposes a struc-
tured model of judicial discretion in these methods.  Not only is such a 
theory able to explain existing practices, but it will also demonstrate 
how they can provide reconstructive solutions to basic limitations of 
legal rules and conventional legal decision making.  This paper intro-
duces such a jurisprudential analysis while discussing the merits of one 
unique version of judicial dispute resolution: “court arbitration com-
promise verdicts”.  This version is an adjudication conducted by a 
judge-arbitrator presiding in the case to terminate a conflict by render-
ing a final decision based on “compromise considerations”.15  Such an 
activity combines authority with consent in a unique way, in which the 
judge-arbitrator decides cases based on considerations that deviate from 
the regular legal rules, and this imposition is validated by the parties’ 
prior consent.16  Court compromise verdicts are not merely a matter of 
theory.  They are a matter of necessity on terms of the high rate of set-
tlement and the pressure on judges to reach them.17  In some common 
13 OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH RESNIK, ADJUDICATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 44 (2003). 
14 Id. at 45-46 (dealing with the difference between court-annexed arbitration and regular adju-
dication). 
15 Martin P. Golding, The Nature of Compromise: A Preliminary Inquiry, in COMPROMISE IN 
ETHICS, LAW, AND POLITICS 4, 20-22 (James R. Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1979) 
[hererinafter Golding, Compromise]. On the law of settlement in general see, e.g., FISS &
RESNIK, supra note 13, at 633-754. 
16 It should be noted that although the compromise consent verdicts discussed in this paper 
are not absolutely identical to the Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration program, they do have 
much in common in the sense that they all combine consent and adjudication, resulting in a 
binding judicial decision. The Delaware’s arbitration processes may have been inspired by the 
ideas expressed below. 
17 “Most cases settle”, and increasing obligations of judges to press parties toward settle-
ment are found in rules and policy statements of the judiciary in common law systems, as well 
as phrases in judicial reported decisions such as “a bad settlement is almost always better than a 
good trial,” which resembles the view of “trial as error.” See Resnik, supra note 4, at 926. 
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law systems, a compromise consent verdict process, which is a sort of 
court arbitration, is available as part of the binding judicial dispute reso-
lution methods.18
The participating parties in a judicial dispute resolution process in 
general, and a court arbitration by compromise in particular, may agree 
on the rules to be followed in the process, including rules19 regarding 
the nature of the process, the matters constituting the subject of the 
process, the manner in which the process will be conducted, the role of 
the judge and any outcome expected of that role, and any practice or 
procedure related to the process.  The present article is focused more 
on the role of the judge-arbitrator, the outcome of the compromise—
the judicial decision sharing/dividing the pie amongst the parties—and
the judicial considerations and discretion leading to the outcome rather 
than the practice or procedure relating to the process. 
Most of those who write on the subject of judicial dispute resolu-
tion and compromise verdicts20 have ignored the advantages of the 
possibility of combining the element of consent with the element of au-
thority to grant the court the power to decide by way of compromise.  
Articulating the advantages of this court arbitration process of com-
promise verdicts, and the attempt to regulate and conceptualize the 
process and determine its bounds, is the challenge facing the authors of 
this article.  The article elaborates a structured hybrid vision of modes 
of compromise as forms of justice, which transcend efficiency and pro-
cedural concerns.  It defines new modes of arbitration which are guided 
by variety of standards.  The innovative modes of compromise pro-
posed in this paper contribute to a more pluralistic notion of judicial 
discretion which enriches the boundaries of adjudication. 
18 Some of the methods of the Alberta JDR and Delaware’s arbitration program were men-
tioned above In Delaware there is a specific process for a settlement option. See Del. Ch. R. 
98(e). A compromise consent verdict method is found in another legal system based on the 
common law tradition. In Israel, with the enactment of sec. 79A of the Courts Law [New Ver-
sion] 1984 by virtue of the Courts (Amendment no. 15) Law, 1992, a court hearing a civil mat-
ter was given the authority to rule, in respect of the matter before it in whole or in part, by way 
of compromise, provided that it obtained the consent of the parties. 
19 Such as those indicated in the Alberta Rules of Court. See Rooke, supra note 5, at 181. 
20 See, e.g., John E. Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise – The Uses of Doubt and Rea-
son, 58 Nw. U. L. Rev. 750 (1964) [hereinafter Coons, Compromise]; John E. Coons, Compromise 
as Precise Justice, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 250 (1980) [hereinafter Coons, Precise Justice]; J. Jaconelli, 
Solomonic Justice and Common Law, 12 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 480 (1992) [hereinafter Jaconelli, 
Solominic Justise]; M. Abramowicz, A Compromise Approach to Compromise Verdicts 89 Cal. L. Rev. 
231 (2001). 
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The use of different modes of compromise consent verdicts sug-
gested in the present article is capable of promoting greater justice (pre-
cise justice, social justice and equity) by integrating new considerations 
into judges’ discretion.  With more regulated forms of compromise of-
fered to the parties, who have the freedom to choose between different 
court arbitration modes of compromise,21 the legal system may become 
more pluralistic and nuanced when responding to the complexity of le-
gal cases. 
In cases of compromise verdicts it appears that the parties seek a 
decision based not only on legal arguments; they seem rather to be in-
terested in other modes of decision making, based on conflict analysis, 
social justice or other considerations.  This new pluralistic mode of ju-
dicial performance preserves the authoritative pre-emptive effect while 
expanding the variety of schemes from which the parties can choose.22
In this paper we offer a model for formulating the court’s discre-
tion in court arbitration consent compromise verdicts by suggesting 
several modes of compromise which reflect and integrate various inter-
ests and policy considerations.  These modes are based on clear guide-
lines and reflect considerations of law, justice, efficiency as well as prin-
ciples of negotiation. 
The first mode reflects the existing situation: Compromise as a short-
cut and prediction.  The usual way of understanding judicial actions aimed 
at compromise is as an attempt to arrive at an approximate decision in 
the case without the need to conduct the case in its entirety.  The judg-
es-arbitrators assess the case and its value, and accordingly decide 
(when the parties authorize them to do so) with a ruling that in their es-
timation is close to what would have been the outcome had the case 
been conducted in its entirety.  Such an attempt focuses on quick and 
efficient determination of the superficial legal dispute, and does not 
seek to resolve it in a deep manner.  This article will not deal with the 
mode of compromise as a shortcut and a prediction; rather, it will deal 
primarily with four other innovative modes that present additional pos-
sible uses of the process of compromise.  These diverse tracks of deci-
sion making can be regulated and encouraged institutionally, and will 
21 On the connection between democracy and compromise see Arthur Kuflik, Morality and 
Compromise, in COMPROMISE IN ETHICS, LAW, AND POLITICS, supra note 15, at 38, 41 [hereinafter 
Kuflik, Compromise]. 
22 The party-preference arguments are among the major reasons for saying that compro-
mises are good. See “Most Cases Settle”, supra note 3, at 1350. 
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enhance legal pluralism.  Our article will deal with the conceptualization 
of the following four modes of compromise verdicts: 
1. Compromise as conflict/dispute resolution 
2. Compromise as precise justice 
3. Compromise as Equity 
4. Compromise as social justice 
Section I will present, in a general manner, the four modes of 
compromise verdicts. The other chapters will discuss in detail each of 
the four modes.  Section II will deal with compromise as conflict reso-
lution.  Section III will deal with compromise as precise justice.  Section 
IV will deal with compromise as Equity, and Section V will deal with 
compromise as social justice.  The last chapter of the article is a conclu-
sion.
I. FOUR MODES OF COMPROMISE
When must the court arbitrator decide on the basis of the special 
considerations of compromise and deviate from decision making on 
the basis of substantive law? 
We suggest four modes of court arbitration by compromise as fol-
lows:
1.     Compromise as a hybrid process that combines judicial authority with 
modes of conflict resolution: Because judges are faced with disputes whose 
complex nature usually extends beyond the confines of the pleadings 
and reaches their courtroom, it is to be assumed that their activity is not 
exhausted by mere prediction, even if it is declared to be such.  Judges 
who conduct negotiations in the courtroom, attempt to mediate, con-
duct dialogue or introduce conciliatory practices usually do so alongside 
their authority to decide on the dispute. 
2.     Compromise as precise justice: Compromise can provide a philo-
sophical answer to situations in which justice according to the law is 
unattainable in principle.  These are situations in which the idea of 
“such is the law, no matter the consequences” or “winner takes all” are 
fundamentally inappropriate for the legal or factual situation.23  From a 
jurisprudential point of view, too, compromise is able to offer more 
precise justice, which can answer theoretical criticism that has been lev-
23 See generally Coons, Precise Justice, supra note 20.
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elled at the law. 
3. Compromise as Equity: The tension between equity and formal 
rules exists mainly when a decision by way of equity is imposed upon 
the parties without their prior consent, whereas they expect a purely le-
gal solution.  In such cases, equity may indeed interfere with stability 
and equality before the law.  It may be considered arbitrary and as caus-
ing instability in the system.  There is no room for such a concern, ac-
cording to our view, when the parties have agreed in advance to an eq-
uity-based decision.  In such cases parties ask for rules which fit the 
unique nature of their conflict. 
4.     Compromise as a balancing of legal rulings with considerations of social 
justice: Implementation of the law is also liable to be fundamentally 
problematic when the law appears to be clear and certain but its im-
plementation appears to be unjust.  Legal decision making may some-
times harm the weak party, or a one-time litigant as opposed to a sea-
soned one, and invoking compromise verdicts may well correct the 
absence of social justice by means of a verdict that combines these con-
siderations.
As long as the parties approach the court having agreed to reach 
an arbitration decision by way of compromise they should again be of-
fered various structured alternatives for reaching a decision.  It is im-
portant that the parties and the court agree on the nature of the com-
promise and choose one of the aforementioned four modes of 
compromise in a way that reflects informed consent and choice.  The 
parties may also choose a mixture of the modes, such as compromise 
focused on interests (mode 1) and social justice (mode 4).  They may 
also indicate the weight of each of the compromise considerations
We will now discuss each of these four modes of compromise 
separately, and present a structured court arbitration process of proper 
judicial discretion.
II. COMPROMISE AS CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Legal disputes are usually framed as narrow controversies about 
facts and norms, which call for strict assignment of rights by judges 
through reference to reason and law.24  The conflicts which underlie le-
gal disputes are usually much broader than what appear as the contro-
versies in courts, and they involve economic, emotional, cultural and 
24 See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353 (1978).
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other various aspects which cannot be captured through legal lenses.25
The interest in the broader picture of legal conflicts goes together with 
an effort to engage deeply in their constructive transformation.  It has 
its roots in the ADR movement, and continues with contemporary in-
novations referring to judging, lawyering and institutional reforms. New 
movements such as the Therapeutic Jurisprudence Movement empha-
size the therapeutic and managerial aspects of judges’ and lawyers’ ac-
tivities.26  New institutional reforms such as the establishment of Prob-
lem-Solving Courts propose structural methods to address the 
complexity of some legal (mostly criminal) conflicts in ways which af-
fect the roles of judges and lawyers.27  Innovations in conflict-
resolution judging such as “solution-based judging”28 and “procedural 
justice”29 approaches flourish in Australia and the US and offer judges 
new roles when dealing with criminal and civil conflicts.  In Alberta 
Canada, the notion of judicial dispute resolution (JDR) has been intro-
duced to regulate the role of judges in reaching settlement, while possi-
bly addressing some aspects of the broadest conflicts.30  These innova-
tions and reforms remain on the margins and so far, no explicit 
discussion has been devoted to the judges’ role in resolving conflicts. 
The pursuit of settlement rather than a deep constructive transfor-
mation of the conflict at hand is the prevailing goal according to cur-
25 The distinction between “disputes” and “conflicts” is defined by John Burton, one of the 
founding fathers of the field of Conflict Resolution in the following way:  “A generalization 
would be that disputes which are confined to interpretations of documents, and disputes over 
material interests in respect of which there are consensus property norms, fall within a tradi-
tional legal framework. Conflicts which involve non-negotiable human needs must be subject to 
conflict resolution processes. These would include many cases of crime and violence”. See John 
W. Burton, Violence Explained: The sources of Conflict, Violence and Crime and Their Preven-
tion 97 (1997). In our discussion a legal dispute is the narrow framing of a broader conflict 
which is based on various interests and needs which are not fully reflected in the claims before 
the courts. Conflicts are many times polycentric. See Fuller, supra note 24, at 371-72. 
26 See generally BRUCE J. WINICK & DAVID B. WEXLER, JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS (2003).
27 Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 
1055 (2002); Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on an 
Effective Innovation, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1285 (2000). 
28 MICHAEL KING, SOLUTION FOCUSED JUDGING BENCH BOOK (2009), available at
http://www.aija.org.au/Solution%20Focused%20BB/SFJ%20BB.pdf.
29 The Journal of American Judges Association, A Special Issue on Procedural Justice, 44 Court 
Rev (2007-2008), available at aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/cr44-1/CR44-1-2.pdf. 
30 The Multi-Tasking Judge, supra note 1, at 157-80. See also JUSTICE JOHN A. AGRIOS, A
HANDBOOK ON JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR CANADIAN LAWYERS 7 (2004), available at
http://cdm16064.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p266901coll4/id/1378.
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rent regulation of judicial activities.31
As Kuflik suggests, compromise has a broader sense than regular 
adjudication (or prediction of the adjudicative outcome).32  In regular 
adjudication the judge considers a matter that happens to be a dispute, 
leaving aside any consideration of the fact that there is an underlying 
conflict; in a compromise, however, additional considerations are 
weighed.  When an issue is in conflict, and a compromise method is 
used, “there is more to be considered than the issue itself—for exam-
ple, the importance of peace, the presumption against settling matters 
by force, the intrinsic good of participating in a process in which each 
side must hear the other side and try to see matters from the other’s 
point of view.”33  Even if the regular judicial activity ought to remain 
focused upon reaching settlement, which relates more to the legal dis-
pute, we argue that with parties’ consent and through the use of com-
promise verdicts, various considerations of conflict resolution can be-
come part of the judicial enterprise. 
This chapter assumes that when a judge-arbitrator decides cases by 
compromise she may use various conflict resolution methods.  It also 
assumes that, based on the parties’ consent,34 judges can expand the ho-
rizons of their judicial work in order to capture some of the various 
contexts which characterize the conflict before them.35  This means that 
after the parties have failed to reach settlement or mediation agreement 
outside the court, and after the efforts of judges to help them settle in 
the courtroom (in a settlement conference) or to mediate between them 
have not succeeded, judges can use their authority, combined with the 
explicit consent of the parties, 36 to incorporate conflict resolution con-
31 The role of lawyers as resolving conflicts, both in criminal and civil cases, has been dis-
cussed as part of the spread of ADR and other movements, but judges were considered as 
more bounded by legal constraints and as striving for compromise in the shadow of the judicial 
prediction. 
32 Kuflik, Compromise, supra note 21, at 38, 51 (1979). 
33 Id.
34 Although the parties failed to reach a settlement on their own, Kuflik argues that the 
agreement to submit the matter to the judgment of a disinterested third party (the judge or arbi-
trator) could well constitute a significant compromise in its own right: “first, the parties con-
cede, in effect, that they are not the best judges of their own dispute; second, they affirm that 
they are prepared to make concessions to one another if, in the considered judgment of a com-
petent judge, that is what they ought to do.”
35 Kuflik, Compromise, supra note 21, at 53 (1979). 
36 Indeed, as stated by Kuflik, “people cannot always work out their differences on their 
own. But even when negotiations fail to produce the terms of settlement, the parties may come 
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siderations into their decision in a court arbitration process.37  Such an 
authorization will redirect the judge’s broad discretion as to the use of 
legal procedure and legal rules and will enable her to focus on the con-
flict aspects of the case.  The unique consent-based adjudication which 
is not bound by the classic perception of rational, external balancing of 
parties’ claims through legal principles (based on rights only) may pro-
duce new and interesting roles for judges in promoting the resolution 
of conflicts. 
A.     Five Types of Arbitration 
Differentiating between outcome and process when dealing with 
compromise is important and useful.38  Conflict resolution studies and 
ADR literature offer modes of transforming conflicts, and we would 
like to use common alternatives to adjudication as relevant for com-
promise consent verdicts and as helpful tools for judges to promote 
constructive reconstructions of conflicts.  Compromise settlements can 
be reached in two ways—by negotiation or by arbitration.39  A negotiat-
ed settlement will sometimes involve services if a mediator—someone
who has no binding authority (but who acts as a go-between).  Arbitra-
tion may be take undertaken either by a person who has been selected 
by the parties themselves or, as in the concern of the present article, by 
away convinced that a compromise solution is in order. For it is often easier to acknowledge 
that what others have to say has some merit and even to concede that one’s own view is not 
immune to reasonable criticism than to see just how competing claims ought to be adjusted. So 
although an agreement on the substance of the matter is not immediately forthcoming there 
may yet be a mutually agreeable third party whose informed, impartial, and sympathetic concern 
commands the respect of all sides.” Id.
37 It should be noticed, as asserted by Kuflik, that in some cases, even if the parties should 
manage to reach a settlement on their own, “there is some danger that it will be a settlement of 
the wrong sort.” Id. “The parties to a dispute are sometimes simply too biased by their own in-
volvement in the matter to be able to give each other a fair hearing,” and therefore “they are 
liable to take one another’s strengths and weaknesses more seriously than their reasons and ar-
guments.” Id. In such cases, argues Kuflik, “one hopes that the balance of morality relevant 
considerations, and not the balance of force, will be more nearly reflected in the judgment of a 
disinterested third party.” Id.
38 Golding, Compromise, supra note 15, at 7 (distinguishing between the end-state and the 
process. The first looks to the result or outcome and tries to see how it compares with the orig-
inal situation for which it is alleged to be a compromise. The second looks to ways and means, 
the methods by which the result is reached, and it characterizes the result as a compromise in 
virtue of the process by which it is achieved). 
39 For a discussion of the methods of settlements: arbitration vs. negotiation see Kuflik, 
Compromise, supra note 21, at 52-55. 
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someone, a judge in a court, who acts under authority of the state.  Par-
ties’ authorization for conflict resolution by a court arbitration in a way 
of compromise can be regulated and may include explicit reference to a 
closed list of hybrids and types of arbitration such as the following:40
Arbitration under a high-low contract: Parties in this arbitration try to 
minimize the risk in the outcome by providing a high and a low limit to 
the judge’s decision.  The process reduces the risk to both sides by 
converting a “win-lose” situation into a “partial-win partial-lose” situa-
tion.41
Final offer Arbitration: This method helps to encourage creative and 
collaborative thinking and here the arbitrator may not compromise but 
must, rather, choose the final offer of either one party or the other.  
This should advance the prospects of successful bargaining.  The par-
ties, knowing that the arbitrator cannot compromise, are likely to as-
sume that he will select the more reasonable offer.42  In legal cases, 
judges can offer parties such a process when opportunities for collabo-
rative thinking seem possible but the parties cannot reach agreement by 
themselves. 
Arbitration based on analysis of interests and barriers: This method of ar-
bitration is the most innovative and the least explored judicial activity in 
promoting settlement.  It may also be considered as the most intriguing 
and inspiring role of judges in imposing compromise.  Judges can func-
tion, with the parties’ consent, as experts in conflict resolution, and can 
impose genuine solutions based on conflict resolution considerations 
when exercising their judicial role.  Typical analysis of conflict resolu-
tion will typically include two types of questions:43
What are the interests/goals of the parties?  In conflict resolution 
literature the interests are “the secret movers” behind the legal posi-
tions and therefore, an important question which a judge may ask the 
parties when the investigating the core of the conflict is “why?”  Why 
do you claim you are entitled to a certain outcome? What is important 
40 The following types of arbitration may be used in legal systems which have a state-
sponsored arbitration program (such as in Delaware). 
41 STEPHEN B GOLDBERG, FRANK A SANDER & NANCY H ROGERS, DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION AND OTHER PROCESSES 225 (1992). 
42 Id. at 223-24. 
43 Frank A. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer, Matching Cases and Dispute Resolution Procedures: De-
tailed Analysis Leading to a Mediation-Centered Approach, 11 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 1 (2006). The au-
thors in this paper suggest a third question which is related to conflict qualities but for the sake 
of this form of arbitration we find it less relevant. 
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for you and what underlies your positions in the way they are framed 
before the court?  Parties may care about various interests such as 
speed, privacy, public vindication, maintaining relationships, improving 
understanding of conflict, creating new solutions and so forth.  Inter-
ests can be addressed. 
What are the impediments which prevent the parties from resolv-
ing this conflict by themselves?  Common barriers are identified in con-
flict resolution literature as: poor communication, the need to express 
emotions, different views of facts/norms, important principles, the 
jackpot syndrome; psychological barriers, unrealistic expectations and 
so forth. 
Using conflict resolution considerations to adjudicate a legal case 
is not always possible.  If some of the interests or needs of the parties 
are related to the processing of their case, and they need communica-
tion, apology or active listening in order to deal effectively with their 
conflict, an authoritative decision may not suffice to answer these 
needs.  The same is true in relation to impediments to settlement, 
which sometimes depend on subjective perceptions such as optimistic 
overconfidence which judges cannot truly overcome.  In some cases, 
such as communication problems, arbitration and adjudication are not 
the right processes for overcoming the difficulty.  Nevertheless, our 
claim is that awareness of such considerations and incorporation of 
some of them into court arbitration compromise verdicts, even if only 
as relevant considerations that are mentioned within the written deci-
sion, may encourage more conflict resolution outside the courtroom.  
Judges may write in such hybrid decisions that they perceive the con-
flict as reflecting a lack of communication or involving diverse subjec-
tive perspectives of facts which can be bridged, and try to decide based 
on a more nuanced narrative of the facts.  They can also emphasize the 
need of one party for acknowledgement and give it to her in their writ-
ing without jeopardizing neutrality or displaying bias.  Such decisions 
can promote peace since they are oriented towards achieving such a 
goal.  The actual outcome may be splitting the difference, but the ar-
gumentation may be based on conflict resolution considerations which 
are intended to bring the parties closer to each other. 
Med-arb.: This is a special framework for reaching a verdict, 
whereby the parties begin mediation on the basis of interests, and if the 
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process fails, arbitration follows on the basis of rights.44  In this way, 
the parties know that if they cannot solve the case on their own, they 
will be given a solution based on rights, which was drafted at the be-
ginning of the procedure.  This process, when conducted in court, will 
provide the parties with assurance that even if the mediation does not 
succeed, they will have the benefit of an authoritative decision which 
resolves the conflict, or at least puts an end to the legal dispute.  The 
problem with such a process is that it usually discourages parties from 
speaking openly about their interests and from revealing information, 
since they know that a judge will decide the case and are afraid to be 
taken advantage of by the other party, who will not reveal her own in-
terests and will claim for the value they created without offering any-
thing on her part.  To overcome such an inclination, an alternative pro-
cess of arb-med was developed. 
Arb-med.: This is a process in which the court rules based on rights, 
but keeps the decision concealed and conducts negotiations to try to 
bring the parties to an agreement.45  The parties know that they have a 
solution if they cannot reach an agreement, but they are not afraid to 
cooperate because even if their concealed interests are revealed, the de-
cision based on their rights has already been made and is not affected 
by this information.  In this case the first decision may be a prediction-
based analysis of the case based on a short presentation.  The later stage 
will be an open-ended discussion of the complexities of the case, in-
cluding interests, emotions and relationships.  Parties can freely develop 
a nuanced constructive solution while remaining assured that a fixed so-
lution is at hand if they fail to reach it.  This process has similarities 
with “post-settlement-settlements” as described by Howard Raiffa.46
Indeed, as Jaconnelli writes in his “Solomonic Justice and Com-
mon Law” article, “adjudication and conciliation, at any rate as far as 
modern legal systems are concerned, are entirely distinct processes.”47
He comments, however, that there are societies “where the function of 
the judge is conceived as conciliatory; that is, to effect a compromise 
between litigants in the interest of retaining intact the web of social re-
lationships.”48  Surprisingly or not, an excellent example of a legal sys-
44 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 41, at 226-27. 
45 Id. at 228. 
46 Howard Raiffa, Post Settlement-Settlement, 1 Negotiation J. 9 (1985). 
47 Jaconelli, Solominic Justice, supra note 20, at 484. 
48 Id. at 484, n. 17. 
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tem that combines adjudication and conciliation is perhaps King Solo-
mon’s Jewish legal tradition.
B.     Compromise as a Peace Adjudication Process
In the modern theoretical literature dealing with compromise ver-
dicts, the term “Solomonic justice” appears frequently, referring to the 
biblical story recounting the manner of judgment of Solomon, King of 
the Jews.  Now, it appears that the famous biblical story about King 
Solomon’s ruling does not refer to the compromise consent verdict dis-
cussed in this article, but undoubtedly it is possible to find in the classi-
cal Jewish sources very extensive discussions about the process of judi-
cial compromise verdicts.49  An analysis of several of these sources, 
which will be undertaken in the present section, will afford us a better 
understanding of the manner in which the compromise may be used as 
a peace adjudication process. 
According to Jewish law, one of the goals of compromise is to 
make peace between the parties.  Compromise is defined in the Talmud 
as “law making which contains peace,50 though it may seem the combi-
nation of law and peace is inherently contradictory.  On the one hand 
there is the familiar discourse of rights so common to legal thinking.  
Such a discourse differentiates between the parties and posits the 
boundaries between them as the subject for authoritative decision.  On 
the other hand there is the discourse of peace which aims at reconcilia-
tion, connection and collaboration, without searching for the ultimate 
truth or the right argument.  Peace, in that sense, is a separate category 
from law. 51 In order to promote peace, personal involvement of parties 
is required, subjective impressions need to be transformed, engagement 
in constructive interactions is needed and deep emphasis on relation-
ship, interests and emotional acknowledgement is encouraged.  Aspira-
tion for peace is not usually a goal in itself in law making, and only 
“public order” is legitimate cause for modifying strict legal applications. 
Peace, according to Lifshitz, compensates for inherent gaps within law.  
It enables people to waive their rights or to acquire rights which they 
do not have, not only for the sake of public order, but to overcome a 
49 See, e.g., MENACHEM ELON, Compromise, in THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW 570-73 (1975). 
50 B.T. Sanhedrin 6b.
51 Itay E. Lipshits, ‘P’shara’ in Jewish Law 137 (July 2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Bar-Ilan University Ramat-Gan, Israel) (on file with author).
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bias or distortion within the law itself.  Peace considerations include 
fraternity, friendship, relationship, and trust.52 Based on the parties’ 
consent, judges can incorporate peace considerations into their deci-
sion, or they can promote a conflict resolution process or a peace-
oriented outcome within conference settlement. 
Rabbi Abraham Itzhak Hakohen Kook (1865-1935), the first 
Ashkenazic Chief Rabbi of the Land of Israel, argued that as a matter 
of legal policy, the court may incorporate peace considerations into its 
decision in cases where, in its opinion, ruling by law may not resolve 
the conflict.53  If a legal decision based on the law is liable to leave bit-
terness and hostility between the parties, a peace-oriented legal decision 
should aspire to avoid these outcomes.  Rabbi Naftali Zvi Yehuda Ber-
lin (Lithuania, 19th century) wrote in the same spirit, saying that if law 
cannot bring peace to the conflict, a compromise decision is sometimes 
desirable.54  His decision related to a public controversy between two 
communities who had an argument based on ethnic differences. Berlin 
realized that deciding by law would not resolve the conflict and bring 
peace and tolerance between the communities in the multicultural soci-
ety, and therefore he deviated from the law and rendered a compromise 
verdict.  The same ruling was given in a case involving young orphans. 
The goal of “reducing the conflict” 55 was mentioned as being in the 
best interest of the orphans, who would have an on-going relationship 
throughout their lives. 
III. COMPROMISE AS PRECISE JUSTICE
A. Court Imposed Compromise as “Precise Justice” – Major Arguments and 
Difficulties
In legal theory court compromise verdicts or court imposed com-
promise have been praised by some scholars as a more justified method 
which overcomes the traditional dichotomic all-or-nothing or “winner 
takes all” method of judicial decision making.  Some perceive the merits 
of the court imposed compromise as reflecting “Solomonic justice”56
and some have viewed compromise as “precise justice”, emphasizing 
52 Id. at 133.
53 Responsa Orah Mishpat, H.M. 1, s.v. vehine be’inyan.
54 Responsa Meshiv Davar 3:10 (Jerusalem, 1968).
55 Sh.Ar. H.M. 12:3  .
56 See Jaconelli, Solominic Justice, supra note 20. 
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the element of equality.57  According to this view there are cases in 
which judges should render a court imposed compromise as the pre-
ferred and more justified legal resolution of the dispute.  Indeed, there 
are cases, especially if the law and the facts in the case are unclear, 
where there may be sound reasons of policy and justice for splitting the 
difference between the parties.58  Parties in those cases may be consid-
ered as having the right to receive a compromise verdict.  If this is the 
case, argues Joseph Jaconelli, we are dealing “not with compromise of
one’s legal right, but rather with compromise as being one’s legal right.”59
These arguments depict the court imposed compromise as a more 
accurate decision making process in a world in which dichotomic deci-
sions are not always possible.  They posit decisions by compromise as a 
deep answer to critical approaches in law, such as Legal Realism and 
Critical legal studies, which have challenged the objectivity of legal deci-
sion making by referring to the indeterminacy of legal rules and to the 
social and economic barriers which they reinforce.60
This approach in favor of court imposed compromise and various 
versions of it, has challenged the conventional dichotomic approach to 
legal decision making and has evoked rich discussions among scholars, 
who have pointed to some downsides of the new concept.  Some have 
criticized the compromise verdicts approach by invoking utilitarian 
considerations.  Others have appealed to justice or due process.  Even 
some of the proponents of court imposed compromise verdicts have 
developed some modified and narrower notions of such verdicts, 
sometimes in response to the criticism against them.  Under such modi-
fied versions, courts may use this mode of decision making only for 
very specific cases, whereas in other cases the traditional dichotomic 
decision making method will apply.  Abramowitz, for example, has of-
fered an intermediate model of a “system of mixed verdict”, which 
benefits from the relative advantages of both modes of decision making 
– dichotomic and compromise alike.61   He offered a scheme of analysis 
to choose among the modes of decision making in different cases. Ac-
cording to his suggestion, the dichotomic method should be applied 
57 See Coons, Compromise, supra note 20; Coons, Precise Justice, supra note 20. 
58 See Golding, Compromise, supra note 15, at 21. 
59 See Jaconelli, Solominic Justice, supra note 20 at 485. 
60 In this sense, compromise verdicts can provide a reconstructive answer to the critique of 
legal formalism. 
61 See Abramowicz, supra note 20. 
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when there is no doubt about the plaintiff’s chances of winning or los-
ing the lawsuit, i.e., when the threshold of probability is high (a situa-
tion in which one party’s version is significantly and compellingly supe-
rior to that of the other party).  By contrast, when the plaintiff’s 
chances of winning are unclear or balanced, the compromise method 
should be chosen.  Coons deals with a compromise that applies a 50-50 
division in cases of factual doubt, when it is not possible to rule in fa-
vor of one side as opposed to the other.62  Scholars who favor the 
compromise method have recommended it in cases of evidentiary bal-
ance (Abramowicz), or advocated a regime of proportional liability in 
tort claims based on causal probability,63 as well as liability based on 
probability in cases of unclear causation. 
B.     Court Arbitration Compromise Verdict as an Opportunity for Performing 
Precise Justice 
We argue that the opposition to court compromise verdicts is 
much more convincing in relation to court imposed compromise verdicts 
which are not authorized in advance by the parties.  Indeed, in such 
cases, the legitimate expectation of the parties is for a decision based on 
a determination of legal rights, which reflects a dichotomic all-or-
nothing approach.  Trying to overcome the shortcomings in such 
dichotomic decisions based on strict legal rules cannot be done by 
courts deviating from these rules, through imposition of compromise 
verdicts on the parties.  In these cases the parties also feel that there is a 
lack of procedural justice, because they are not really aware of what are 
the considerations for the court imposed compromise verdicts. 
On the other hand, if parties acknowledge the shortcomings of 
law both from a jurisprudential perspective and due to efficiency con-
siderations, the possibility of the judge-arbitrator rendering compro-
mise consent verdicts may be much more justified.  The parties in such 
cases are aware of their legal rights and of their chances of winning in 
court, and they nevertheless choose to authorize the court to render 
compromise verdicts in a court arbitration process.  The parties may 
choose to enjoy the benefits of compromise verdicts, and can decide 
which mode of compromise they authorize the judge to impose. 
62 See Coons, Compromise, supra note 20. 
63 John Makdisi, Proportional Liability: A Comprehensive Rule to Apportion Tort Damages based on 
Probability, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 231 (1989).
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The advantages of court arbitration compromise consent verdicts 
over court imposed compromise verdicts, insofar as we are dealing with 
the goal of precise justice, extend well beyond the justification and au-
thorization perspectives alone.  Expanding the range of possible com-
promise verdicts is a significant improvement to legal decision making. 
Imposed compromise verdict are justified, even according to Coons, 
only in specific cases,64 and he lists ten examples in which, due to a fac-
tual doubt, the dichotomic legal solution cannot be considered justified 
and right in the circumstances. Splitting the difference between the 
parties in such cases (which Coons defines as “doubt-compromise”)
should be preferred, but this equally-divided fifty-fifty compromise, 
Coons insists, should be strict and not amenable to different divisions.65
Some scholars have challenged that view and called for different types 
of divisions, such as seventy-thirty or sixty-forty compromises.66  Oth-
ers claim that Coons’ proposal does not really overcome the “winner 
takes all” perception of law: “You can say that in this particular case we 
will compromise for various reasons, but this is a very rare and special 
instance where we will allow such a result.”67 Our claim is that adding 
the consent element to compromise verdicts will allow the parties to au-
thorize the judge to provide a compromise decision in a court arbitra-
tion process which will accurately reflect the parties’ rights or their evi-
dence.  It will afford the court broader discretion to approve various 
divisions of the pie (not only fifty-fifty) and to do so in a broad range 
of cases.  Factual controversies require a much more complex perspec-
tive based on partiality and probability. According to Fuller: 
Except that I think, characteristically, truth questions are closer to 
the negligence question than we imply.  That is to say something hap-
pened; neither one of may be lying.  Each is putting his best foot for-
ward; each has improved on the story in remembering it.  So you are 
asking yourself, well, let’s see, which of these stories is the closest—and
perhaps neither is very close—but you are ready to accept.  You are 
dealing with probabilities.68
64 Coons, Compromise, supra note 20, at 753-54. 
65 The reason for this, Coons argues: “As long as we confine our attention to instances of bal-
anced probability, any division other than fifty-fifty would discriminate against one party. In other 
words, it would offend the equality principle”. Id. at 759. 
66 See id. at 800. 
67 Id. at 802; see also id. at 802-03 (“I am not suggestion this would be an across the board 
proposition, You have to be very careful about the areas you select”).
68 Id. at 800. 
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When parties agree to accept compromise-based decisions in a 
court arbitration process they may be considering the possibility of en-
dorsing a decision which takes into account critical claims about legal 
decision making. 
During the previous century, a famous attack on legal objectivity 
and on legal formalism in general was launched by the Legal Realism 
movement during the 1920s, followed by the Critical Legal Studies 
movement during the 1970s.69  The Realists developed a theory of rule 
skepticism and claimed that legal decisions cannot be explained as be-
ing “based on mechanistic applications of rules.”  Instead, they argued, 
it is more realistic to claim that rules are indeterminate and that legal 
doctrine is filled with gaps, ambiguities and multiple interpretational 
possibilities, which make it impossible to objectively decide cases with-
out exercising a broad discretion. Some of the Realists and their prede-
cessors, like Llewellyn and Kennedy, claimed that behind each rule 
there are conflicting principles which call for opposite interpretations, 
and that judges can never decide by a pure reference to rules, since bal-
ancing between these principles is part of the process of legal decision 
making.  This balancing cannot be structured rationally, according to 
Realists or critical scholars. It is affected by personal or ideological mo-
tivations. Another major claim which Realists and other critical writers 
developed was that legal facts cannot be determined objectively, and 
that judges suffer from biases and multiple perspectives which make 
their factual determinations biased and subjective.70  These critiques of 
and challenges to basic legal tenets produced turmoil in legal academe 
and have been followed by various efforts at reconstruction.  One pos-
sibility of overcoming the indeterminacy of rules and facts is to propose 
a court arbitration judgment based on compromise and not on pure le-
gal reasoning.  The possibility of working with critical claims as con-
structive paradoxes has never been discussed by the Realists, and in ar-
bitration studies, but there may be agreement among the parties that 
rule and fact skepticism will guide judges’ decisions when they try to 
give a nuanced decision which does not claim for full objectivity. Such 
a decision can be called “precise justice” since it overcomes the “winner 
takes all” assumption of mainstream jurisprudence.  It is more sensitive 
to gaps and doubts while remaining pragmatic and constructive when 
69 ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986). 
70 JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1973). 
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working with them. 
IV. COMPROMISE AS EQUITY
Although ruling by compromise based on equity is mentioned in 
some places when the development of the common law is reviewed, 
the basic rule which remained throughout common law history is that 
the winner takes all,71 and equity has not developed as an independent 
cause.72  Even in more recent times, again with a few notable excep-
tions, the traditional rule of “winner takes all” continues to hold sway.73
Why the option of compromise on the basis of equity is not used 
widely in common law?  This may be related to the struggle between 
law and equity.  The nature of law is to determine rules, and to provide 
solutions which are intended to be applied in future to an unlimited 
number of cases.  This feature of law creates a unique problem of cor-
relation between case and rule.  There are cases, and maybe most of le-
gal cases are such, in which the particular circumstances of the case do 
not slot into the strict rules.  Aristotle dealt with these situations and 
suggested overcoming them through the use of equity, or epiekeia,
which means to amend the law in such a way as to prevent its generality 
from interfering with the need to do justice in the concrete case.  The 
dialectic between legal formality and other considerations is regulated 
differently within each legal system.  Our efforts are aimed at articulat-
ing a certain balance which is appropriate for consent compromise ver-
dicts, and which may expand the traditional perception of the role of 
law.  But first, let us discuss further the relationship between common 
law and equity. 
Traditionally, as shown by Atiya, in the English legal tradition 
there exist two widely differing approaches to dispute resolution and 
the law.74  One approach requires cases to be decided according to gen-
eralized and inflexible rules.  The second approach emphasizes the im-
portance of individualized justice, of adjudication of the specific facts 
of the case in question.  Throughout much of English legal history the-
se two approaches have been embodied in the systems of the common 
law and Equity respectively. With the crystallization of Equity laws, and 
71 Jaconelli, Solomonic Justice, supra note 20, at 487. 
72 Coons, Compromise, supra note 20, at 767. 
73 Jaconelli, Solomonic Justice, supra note 20, at 488.
74 P. S. ATIYA, FROM PRINCIPLES TO PRAGMATISM: CHANGES IN THE FUNCTION OF THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS AND THE LAW (1978). 
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especially after their inclusion within the common law system during 
the 19th century,75 they became more general and predictable.  This 
process of formalization helped to prevent arbitrariness and at the same 
time made these laws less case-sensitive.  Some have described the de-
velopment of the ADR movement as representing the formalization of 
a new Equity approach, this time based on the procedural processing of 
disputes.76
Our main argument is that the tension between equity and formal 
rules exists mainly when a decision by way of equity is imposed upon 
the parties without their prior consent, while they expect a purely legal 
solution.  In such cases, equity may indeed interfere with stability and 
equality before the law.  It may be considered arbitrary and as causing 
instability in the system.  There is no room for such a concern, accord-
ing to our view, when the parties have agreed in advance to an equity-
based decision in a court arbitration process.  In such cases parties ask 
for rules which fit the unique nature of their conflict.  The relation be-
tween equity-based decision and parties consent is found in Delaware’s 
state-sponsored arbitration program mentioned above, in which, as we 
had seen in Chapter I, the Chancery Court judge presiding over the 
proceedings “[m]ay grant any remedy or relief that [s/he] deems just 
and equitable and within the scope of any applicable agreement of the 
parties.”77  Still, equity as an open-ended aspiration of law remains a 
separate category within our framework. 
The limits of formal law have been extensively described and de-
bated in jurisprudential thinking and legal theory in general.  We have 
tried to present some of the challenges to the formality of law within 
the various modes of compromise consent verdicts we proposed for 
court arbitration.  We believe that these new modes offer new regulated 
forms of equity and they all enable various new balances between rules 
and discretion.  Nevertheless, even after parties consider each of the 
three modes on its own merits, we believe that the possibility going 
back to Equity as a law making method which incorporates general 
considerations of justice may still exist within the system we propose.  
A court arbitration by compromise based on ethics will be a return to 
75 For a more extensive discussion of this topic, see C. K. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 399-
441 (1964). 
76 Austin Sarat, The ‘New Formalism’ in Disputing and Dispute Processing, 21 Law & Soc’y Rev.
695 (1988). 
77 Del. Ch. R. 98(f)(1). 
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the old role of law making as doing justice, reviving it through the par-
ties’ endorsement.
V. COMPROMISE AS SOCIAL JUSTICE
The incorporation of distributive justice considerations into legal 
decision making is usually considered problematic, since the common 
assumption is that the legislator determines the consensual distributive 
principles in the law and the judges apply them in an equal way.  Cases 
of court imposed compromise verdicts have also been criticized when 
they invoked such considerations.78  We argue, however, that this criti-
cism is less applicable to court arbitration compromise consent ver-
dicts.
The role of law in promoting social justice has been a major con-
cern of many jurisprudential schools, both from a critical and a norma-
tive perspective.  A major sociological claim in this context is that with-
in the reality of legal disputes handled in the court, the “haves” have 
various advantages over the “have nots”, and that repeat players and 
big organizations are more likely to utilize the system to acquire gain 
and to win long-term benefits, often at the expense of the disadvan-
taged.79  From a normative perspective, some have argued that the role 
of law is to institute structural reforms, to transform society, and to use 
legal decision making to promote a form of justice which is transforma-
tive and has an educative value.80  Inequalities in society have been a 
major concern for many legal scholars, and traditionally courts and 
judges have been considered responsible for balancing them.  Although 
adjudication is not supposed to favor the poor over the rich on the in-
dividual level, and judges are supposed to apply a balanced principled 
measure in the concrete case, as a policy matter new rules and prece-
dents are intended, according to some legal thinkers, to promote greater 
equality in society and to prevent the oppression of the weaker com-
munities.
A judicial policy of promoting social justice has also been broadly 
criticized by some legal scholars and philosophers as anti-democratic, 
against integrity and biased.  If a certain distribution of goods or as-
78 Jaconelli, Solomonic Justice, supra note 20, at 498-504. 
79 Marc Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L.
& Soc’y 95 (1974). 
80 Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1 
(1979). 
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signments of rights in society was approved by the legislator or has an 
historical foundation, how can a judge use her biased interpretive skills 
to challenge this distribution and to demarcate the social boundaries in 
society?  These critics have often described the social justice interpreta-
tion as activism, and have called for greater restraint and neutral policy 
in applying legal rules. 
Our discussion shifts this debate about the role of law in promot-
ing social justice to the more pluralistic terrain of many types of con-
flicts and many possible legitimate standards for legal decision making.  
The recourse to court arbitration compromise consent verdicts may 
open a legitimate and unique track for introducing social justice consid-
erations into judicial dispute resolution legal decision making.  We are 
not suggesting here a policy of promoting social justice while creating 
new rules, as some legal scholars have suggested, and therefore we are 
not interfering with the majoritarian principle nor with the official dis-
tribution principles as provided by the state.  Instead we propose a bot-
tom-up market of individual compromises, in which social justice con-
siderations are consensually incorporated into the court arbitration legal 
decision making process.  Such developments may fit certain types of 
disputes, and may promote a more pluralistic consent-based perception 
of justice within the legal system. 
Cases which include big organizations facing small citizens may 
call for an offer to the parties to authorize the judge-arbitrator to incor-
porate social justice principles in a compromise consent verdict.  Such 
considerations may anyway infiltrate judges’ decisions, when they deal 
with a severe perceived imbalance in a case before them, but usually 
their compassionate treatment may be interpreted as biased and as go-
ing against the rule of law principle.  Organizations’ representative ex-
perience in such cases as receiving unfair treatment and as being co-
erced to give what they do not owe according to the law.  In contrast to 
the usual mode of adjudication, when social compassion is legitimate 
and authorized by the parties as part of the decision making, such 
judgment may be good for all parties involved.  The weak party will re-
ceive acknowledgement and material recognition as a lone gun-man 
taking on the big organization.  The repeat player organization will gain 
a reputation and acknowledgement as having a social justice agenda and 
as activist in terms of protecting customers and weak populations.  So-
ciety will gain greater equality and the closing of systemic gaps from 
which it suffers.  The legal system may benefit from a pro-social image 
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which signifies generosity and social responsibility as publicly encour-
aged by the court. Such developments may flourish when offered by 
law, and may become mainstream modes of decision making in some 
areas of law. 
Three contemporary examples of compromise verdicts given by 
Israeli rabbinical court arbitrators may serve to illustrate the potential in 
compromise consent verdicts based on social justice.  In these cases the 
consent of the parties for such a decision was given by litigants by 
choosing the religious court—authorizing it to render a compromise 
verdict as an arbitrator—and by preferring it over the general secular 
system.  We argue that the legal considerations weighed by the religious 
court reflect legal pluralism,81 which can become a model of main-
stream legal decision making. 
The first is the case of a teacher who was fired unfairly at a time 
when it was hard for him to find a job.82  Although the school had the 
right to fire him according to the contract, and although the teacher 
was not poor according to formal criteria, the court ruled “beyond what 
the law requires” (lifnim mishurat hadin) that the school should compen-
sate the teacher.  The court said that the school has wealthy donors and 
its pockets are deeper, so therefore it should compensate the individual 
in the name of social justice. 
A second example is the case of another teacher who was fired af-
ter two years of employment in a school in Safed (northern Israel).  
Following his dismissal he had to relocate his family to the south of Is-
rael to his new workplace.  After a year the school asked the teacher to 
come back and rehired him to teach, but one year later he was fired 
again.  The teacher sued for compensation for his three years of work 
and also for the costs of relocation.  The court granted both demands; 
among the reasons for its ruling, the court wrote that the plaintiff had 
not found a job yet, and since he is considered a pauper the decision 
should go “beyond what the law requires” (lifnim mishurat hadin) based 
on social justice considerations.83
A third example actually comprises a group of cases in which reli-
gious courts enabled debtors to spread out their repayments, even 
though from a strict legal perspective they were obligated to repay their 
81 See Adam Hofri-Winogradow, A Plurality of Discontent: Legal Pluralism, Religious Adjudication 
and the State, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 101-33 (2010). 
82 YOEZER ARIEL, LAWS OF ARBITRATION 224 (2005) (Heb.). 
83 Id. at 225-26. 
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debt immediately.  Such cases were interpreted as following the princi-
ple of going beyond what the law requires; taking into account the eco-
nomic situation of the debtor was within the court’s discretion, since 
the parties had agreed in advance to be judged by law or by compro-
mise.84
These examples, which stem from a communal and religious sys-
tem of law, may inspire mainstream adjudication in secular courts and 
expand the possibilities which are available to judges when confronting 
legal conflicts.  When parties agree to promote certain values and poli-
cies, judges should be authorized to respect such choices and to incor-
porate into the law considerations which go beyond the rules, while not 
violating general principles of the rule of law.  In time, such develop-
ments may acquire their own general characteristics and may function 
as open code systems to inform new disputants in new circumstances. 
CONCLUSION
Our paper has argued for a new role for court arbitration judges 
deciding cases by compromise, based on the parties’ consent.  We sug-
gested that this mode of judicial dispute resolution can overcome some 
basic limitations of legal rules and legal decision making.  It can pro-
mote more precise justice, overcome the indeterminacy of rules and 
facts, promote social justice, enhance equity and combine new consid-
erations into judges’ discretion.  With more regulated forms of court 
arbitration  by compromise and the explicit consent of the parties, the 
legal system may become much more pluralistic and nuanced when re-
sponding to the complexity of legal cases. 
Considering the fact that most cases settle and do not reach a final 
formal decision based on law, and that only a small part of them is re-
solved through ADR, judges have a significant role in the settling of le-
gal disputes.  Although their role has changed dramatically in the past 
few decades, its new nature has not brought about a corresponding 
shift in legal thought, and has remained largely unexplored.  Our paper 
contributes to a new conceptualization, hopefully followed by new reg-
ulation, of the judges’ role in cases of consent of the parties to court 
arbitration compromise verdicts.  Such consent makes possible an in-
teresting mixture of authority and consent, legal rules and social com-
plexity, autonomy and community, old and new. 
84 Id. at 224-25. 
